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ABSTRACT 
This project examines how the Soviet Union and China competed for global 
influence during and after the Vietnam War, despite both backing communist North 
Vietnam. This thesis examines the Vietnam War’s effects on the ideological split in Sino-
Soviet relations both during and after the Vietnam war, from the polemical attacks 
between the two to the creation of Interkit, a Soviet-established multinational 
organization created to constrain China’s international influence, and the Sino-Soviet 
border battle on the Ussuri River. Through an analysis of Sino-Soviet competition in 
Vietnam, this project will examine how the three “superpowers” – the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and China – intersected in Vietnam, transforming Sino-Soviet relations. 
This research predominantly draws upon primary-source documents, including meeting 
notes, memorandums, and international communications, from a variety of historical and 
national security archives. This project argues that China sought to use the Vietnam War 
to turn their militantly anti-imperialist agenda from rhetoric to action, which conflicted 
with the Soviet Union’s less aggressive stance of “peaceful coexistence.” These 
competing viewpoints, from the countries the North Vietnamese internally referred to as 
their “two big brothers,” played not only an important role in North Vietnam’s military 
strategy in the early 1960s, but also in the Soviet Union and China’s policies and attitudes 
towards one other.  
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INTRODUCTION 
China sought to use the Vietnam War to turn its militantly anti-imperialist agenda 
from rhetoric to action, which conflicted with the Soviet Union’s less aggressive stance 
of “peaceful coexistence.” These competing viewpoints, from the countries the North 
Vietnamese internally referred to as their “two big brothers,” played not only an 
important role in North Vietnam’s military strategy in the early 1960s but also in the 
Soviet Union and China’s policies and attitudes towards one other. This project examines 
the Vietnam War’s effects on Sino-Soviet relations both during and after the Vietnam 
war, from the polemical attacks between the two to the creation of Interkit, a Soviet-
established multinational organization created to constrain China’s international 
influence, to the 1969 Sino-Soviet border war on the Ussuri River. Through an analysis 
of Sino-Soviet competition in Vietnam, this project will examine how the three 
“superpowers” – the United States, the Soviet Union, and China – intersected in Vietnam, 
transforming Sino-Soviet relations. 
This thesis argues that rather than boost the Soviet Union or China’s status with a 
communist victory, the Vietnam War propped up the Chinese in their struggles with the 
Soviets. The Vietnam War forced the Soviets to confront a young and energetic adversary 
in China, which threatened their hegemony in Europe and Asia. This thesis will begin 
with a brief analysis of the divergence between Soviet and Chinese conceptions of 
Marxism-Leninism, arguing that this divergence manifested itself in each country’s 
respective attitudes and policies regarding the Vietnam War. In analyzing the Sino-Soviet 
competition in Vietnam, this project will also introduce Interkit, an understudied 
organization whose existence legitimated the Soviet Union’s concerns over China’s rise 
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to international prominence. Lastly, the paper will analyze the Sino-Soviet (1969) and 
Sino-Vietnamese (1979) border conflicts and makes the argument that the Chinese 
application of their doctrine of revolutionary warfare, in which they promoted guerilla 
warfare to win over the people and defeat a more powerful group, failed in post-war 
Vietnam, as it was not apt to foster peacetime development. 
The thesis is organized into five thematic, chronological sections (with overlap 
between multiple major events): the roots of Chinese and Soviet ideologies (1917-1956), 
the Vietnam War (1957-1975), Interkit (1966-1985), the Sino-Soviet border conflict 
(1969), and post-war Vietnam (1975-1979). With the section on ideology serving as a 
preface to the core chapters on the Vietnam War, the scope of this paper spans from 1957 
to 1979, from shortly after the initiation of the Vietnam War (the Second Indochina War) 
to just after its end. 
In 1950, shortly after the Communist Party of China defeated the Nationalist 
Chinese government in the Chinese Civil War, the Soviet Union and China signed the 
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. In this treaty, the 
Soviets formally recognized the new leadership of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
While articles one and two of the treaty discussed mutual defense against potential 
attacks from Japan (given that the treaty was only five years removed from World War 
II), the remaining articles discussed broad requirements and goals to form a strong bond 
between the Soviet Union and China. They stated that neither country was permitted to 
make any alliance threatening to the other country and that they were to consult each 
other on “all international problems affecting the common interests of China and the 
Soviet Union.” The signatories promised to respect each other’s borders and internal 
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affairs and maintain a strong, mutually beneficial economic relationship, concluding with 
a statement that the treaty would be valid for 30 years (until 1980).1  
This treaty of alliance gave the perception of a united communist front between 
the USSR and China, but whatever ties bound these countries together came apart in the 
early 1960s with the Sino-Soviet ideological split. Nikita Khrushchev came to power in 
1953, denounced Stalinism in 1956, and adopted a less aggressive policy of peaceful 
coexistence towards the West. Because of this shift, in 1961, Mao Zedong and the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) publicly denounced the Soviets as “revisionist 
traitors.”2 Mao and other CCP officials, as well as Chinese allies, used this term to attack 
the Soviets frequently through the 1960s. For example, Enver Hoxha, who led Albania 
from 1944 to 1985, also called the Soviets “revisionist traitors” in 1967, including them 
in the same group as imperialists and describing them as “enemies and traitors of 
Marxism-Leninism.”3 By repeatedly deploying the “revisionist” line of attack, China, 
supported by Romania and Albania, was suggesting that the Soviet Union had watered 
down or abandoned true Marxist-Leninist ideology. In particular, they were accusing the 
Soviets as having abandoned the core Marxist belief of anti-imperialism.   
                                                
A note on footnotes: all URLs to digital sources are included in the Works Cited. 
 
1 “The Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance Between the People's 
Republic of China and the Soviet Union.” CIA Library, 30 Aug. 2000. pp. 2-3.  
1 “The Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance Between the People's 
Republic of China and the Soviet Union.” CIA Library, 30 Aug. 2000. pp. 2-3. 
2 Carey, Elaine. Protests in the Streets: 1968 across the Globe. Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc., 2016. p. 4. 
3 “Memorandum of Conversation between comrade Enver Hoxha and a Delegation of 
Chinese Red Guards,” July 08, 1967, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 
AQSH, F. 14/AP, M-PKK, V. 1967, Dos. 43, Fl. 1-18. 
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In July 1960, as China continued to denounce the Soviet Union as revisionists to 
Marxism-Leninism, Khrushchev announced the withdrawal of all 1500 Soviet specialists 
working in China, stating that the specialists were unable to “endure this environment of 
distrust and suspicion,” and it was therefore the case that “the further presence of the 
Soviet specialists in the PRC is in practical terms impossible.”4 Austin Jersild, in The 
Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History, explains that this withdrawal caused the 
Chinese to increase efforts to improve relations with East Germany and other central 
European countries, but the Eastern bloc countries were not going to “choose China over 
the Soviet Union, and the Chinese-Central European relationship quickly deteriorated.”5 
After Leonid Brezhnev took power from Khrushchev in 1964, both he and Mao were 
hopeful that they could improve Sino-Soviet relations. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai led a 
delegation to Moscow in November 1964, but the Chinese, Jersild notes, “were well past 
the point of compromise” and could not find common ground on the issue of 
imperialism.6 Thus, despite both countries supporting the Vietnamese communists, the 
Sino-Soviet relationship was deeply fractured as the war intensified.  
A fatal flaw of U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam, about which significant literature 
exists, was that policymakers were stuck in a Cold War mindset. Many U.S. 
policymakers, given the commonality of policymakers’ belief in the “domino theory,” 
could only conceive of the conflict in Vietnam as a binary clash of capitalism versus 
                                                
4 “Letter, Khrushchev to the Central Committee of The Socialist Unity Party of Germany, 
regarding Soviet Specialists in China,” July 18, 1960, History and Public Policy Program 
Digital Archive, SAPMO DY 30/3605/25-27. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by 
Austin Jersild. 
5 Jersild, Austin. Sino-Soviet Alliance: an International History. Univ Of North Carolina 
Pr, 2016. pp. 165-166. 
6 Ibid. pp. 173-174. 
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communism. Under this logic, it might seem intuitive to believe that the Vietnam War, in 
which the United States was unable to achieve its aims, was therefore a Soviet and 
Chinese victory. For example, Ilya Gaiduk, senior research fellow at the Institute of 
World History at the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow, argued that because the 
Soviet Union supported North Vietnam (Officially the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 
the DRV) with a barrage of military and economic aid, “Moscow improved its image as a 
vigilant champion of the national liberation movements and proved its credibility in the 
eyes of allies and clients.”7  
 However, while the Vietnam War did provide a platform for both the Soviet 
Union and China to boast a victory for communism against capitalism and imperialism, 
those are not sufficient grounds to declare the war a success for either. Supporting the 
winning side in the Vietnam War did not inherently give power to anyone except the 
North Vietnamese themselves. Rather, it provided both the Soviet Union and China a sort 
of symbolic capital to spend achieve their goals of increased global power, and the 
security, trade, and cultural benefits that came with this power.  
An examination of China, the Soviet Union, and the Vietnam War should not end 
when the war ends but should also include analysis of how the Soviets and Chinese 
moved forward after the North Vietnamese victory. Particularly in viewing the Vietnam 
War within the larger context of the Cold War, it is important to follow the story beyond 
the fall of Saigon. A post-war analysis requires discussion of Soviet and Chinese goals in 
Vietnam and analysis of to what extent each met these goals.  Leaders from the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and CCP frequently stated that their main 
                                                
7 Gaiduk, Ilya V. The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (1996). p. 248. 
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objective was to defend North Vietnam from “U.S. imperialist aggression.”8 Less 
directly, however, the Soviet Union and China competed in Vietnam for the title of leader 
of the world communist movement. Jeremy Friedman, in Shadow Cold War: The Sino-
Soviet Competition for the Third World, argues that the Soviet Union and People’s 
Republic of China competed internationally – in Asia, Africa, and Latin America – for 
the “leadership of the world revolution.”9 This begs the question: What were the tangible 
benefits to carrying this title of leader of the world communist movement? 
 For both the Soviet Union and China, achieving the reputation of the top 
communist nation entailed shifting the balance of power within the global communist 
countries to favor their own respective country. In understanding this in the context of 
Sino-Soviet competition in Vietnam, I will use Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi’s definition 
of power, which reads: 
The means by which a state or other actor wields or can assert actual or 
potential influence or coercion relative to other states and non-state actors 
because of the political, geographic, economic and financial, 
technological, military, social, cultural, or other capabilities it possesses. 10  
 
                                                
8 An example of the Soviets using this rhetoric from a CPSU Central Committee Report: 
“Information No. 098 by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee to 
the Socialist Unity Party Central Committee [Excerpts],” February 24, 1965, History and 
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/3667, 146-156.  
 
An example of the Chinese using this rhetoric from Mao Zedong, in which Mao 
emphasizes the need to resist “U.S. imperialist aggression, control, intervention or 
bullying:” Mao, Zedong. People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and 
All Their Lackeys; Statements Supporting the Afro-Americans and the Peoples of 
Southern Vietnam, Panama, Japan, the Congo (L.) and the Dominican Republic in Their 
Just Struggle against U. S. Imperialism. Foreign Languages Press, 1967. 
 
9 Friedman, Jeremy Scott. Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Split and the Third World. 
University of North Carolina Press, 2015. p. 14. 
10 Viotti, Paul R, and Mark V Kauppi. International Relations and World Politics. 5th 
ed., Pearson, 2013. 
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Although the Soviet Union and China’s public statements implied strictly defensive goals 
to stop American imperialism, they each had aims to increase their power, and therefore 
their respective spheres of influence, both in Southeast Asia and in the world communist 
movement. This tangibly meant bolstering their political, economic, and military 
capabilities.11 Thus, the phrase “competing for influence” in Vietnam refers to the Soviet 
Union and China’s battling for power with each other, using Vietnam as their platform.  
 The extent to which gaining a strong socialist ally in Southeast Asia would 
increase either country’s sphere of influence, if at all, is impossible to quantify. In its use 
of the term “sphere of influence,” this thesis will rely on the Oxford English Dictionary 
definition, which states: “A country or area in which another country has power to affect 
developments though it has no formal authority.”12 Regardless of what the actual 
potential impact of the Vietnam War on China or the USSR’s spheres of influence was, 
there was a strong perception that extending one’s system of beliefs to other countries 
around the world bolstered one’s sphere of influence. This, in turn, would bolster a 
country’s reputation, as well as their political, economic, and military power. The United 
States and Soviet Union’s competition and attempted partition of the rest of the world 
throughout the Cold War reflects this idea of the power associated with one’s sphere of 
influence. 
Not only did the Soviet Union and China perceive an opportunity to extend their 
spheres of influence into Southeast Asia by way of Vietnam, but the Vietnam War also 
                                                
11 Radchenko, Sergey. “Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for 
Supremacy, 1962-1967.” Stanford University Press, 2009. p. 126. 
12 “Definition of Sphere in English by Oxford Dictionaries.” Oxford Dictionaries | 
English. Web. 
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carried particular strategic implications for China (compared to the Soviet Union), as they 
shared a 1,306-kilometer border with Vietnam. The result of the Vietnam War had an 
additional security ramification for China, as it would determine their relations with 
whatever government was to come out of the Vietnam War. 
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CHAPTER I: ROOTS OF CHINESE AND SOVIET IDEOLOGIES 
Analyzing Sino-Soviet relations during the Cold War demands a discussion of the 
two countries’ most obvious commonality: Communism as the ideological foundation of 
their political, economic, and social systems. Although the West lumped the Soviet 
Union and China together as “Second World” countries based on their communist beliefs, 
the ideological differences in Soviet Communism and Chinese Communism were 
significant and manifested themselves during the Vietnam War. 
 Communism is a system of governance inspired by Marxist ideology. This 
phrasing is important, as it distinguishes the difference between the two. Marxism is the 
theory of economics and a view of history that argues class struggle to be the root cause 
of social change in human history. How a ruling party interprets Marxist theory will 
manifest itself in that state’s implementation of Communism.  
Lenin’s most significant divergence from Marxist theory was his belief in a 
“revolutionary vanguard,” which allowed for a system of governance in which a central, 
communist party would oversee the revolution and state.  Lenin disagreed with Marx on 
how the communist revolution ought to develop, arguing, “Class political consciousness 
can be brought to the workers only from…outside of the economic struggle, from outside 
the sphere of relations between workers and employers.”13 This view signified that Lenin 
believed revolutionary politicians like himself, although they were not in the working 
class, had a leadership role to play in the revolutions.  
Not only did Lenin argue for a role for communist leaders in the revolution, but 
Lenin also argued for the revolutionary capability of the peasantry. Similar to the 
                                                
13 Lenin, Vladimir. What Is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement. 
International Publishers, 1929. 
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Georgian Socialists, Lenin and the Bolsheviks promoted the idea that underdeveloped, 
agrarian countries, like Russia and China (at the time of their respective revolutions) were 
well-suited for Communism. The Georgian Socialists, in the early 20th century, argued 
that the peasantry in an agrarian state was capable of a socialist revolution.   
Mao drew inspiration from this same model and attributed the possibility for his 
revolution and others to the October Revolution, praising it for enabling “a new front of 
revolutions against world imperialism.”14  Mao lectured at an anti-Japanese university 
from 1937 to 1938 and reportedly read much of Lenin’s writing. Additionally, Mao 
reportedly also studied China’s history with imperialism in depth, arguing that the turning 
point in their history was the 1840 Opium War, in which the “penetration by foreign 
capitalism” began its attack on China.15 Quickly after the CCP victory in 1950, China 
became heavily involved in the Korean War, which Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai describe 
as “the natural result of gradually developed animosity between the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) and what it regarded as the foreign imperialist powers, especially the United 
States, and of the fear of a threat from the latter.”16 
It is crucial to understand that Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism were not three 
distinct ideologies, but rather variations of Marxism. Leninism and Maoism were the 
means by which the Soviets and Chinese shaped Marxism to their own respective 
countries. Each held the majority of Marxist theory to be sacred. Further, given Lenin’s 
                                                
14 Zedong, Mao. Revolutionary Forces of the World Unite, Fight against Imperialist 
Aggression! 1968. 
15 Deckers, Wolfgang. “Imperialism' and 'Anti-Imperialism' in Mao Zedong: Origins and 
Development of a Revolutionary Strategy.” The London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 1 Jan. 1997. pp. 168, 178. 
16 Yufan, Hao, and Zhai Zhihai. “China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History 
Revisted.” The China Quarterly, vol. 121, 1990, p. 94.  
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revolutionary role as the preeminent believer that countries like Russia and China could 
successfully implement Communism via a revolution, he and his ideas were revered by 
not only the Soviet leaders post-Stalin, but also by Mao. In particular, both governments 
employed the crux of Lenin’s argument in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, 
in which Lenin argued that capitalism naturally leads to a struggle for the “division of the 
world” amongst capitalist powers.17 Given this connection, Lenin notably associated 
capitalism with imperialism, frequently criticizing both. Thus, these core anti-capitalist, 
anti-imperialist principles of Marxism-Leninism became inviolable to future Soviet and 
Chinese leaders.  
 The Soviet Union, in its initial years from 1919-1956, was strongly anti-
imperialist. Shortly after taking power, the Bolsheviks signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 
with the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire) 
in March 1918, which ended Soviet Russia’s involvement in World War I. One day prior 
to this treaty, the Comintern (also referred to as Communist International or the Third 
International) held its first congress, with the mission to “struggle by all available means, 
including armed force, for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie and the creation 
of the international Soviet republic as a transition stage to the complete abolition of the 
state.”18 The Soviet Union initially held a policy of “nativization” toward their republics 
(including, after World War II, the Baltic states), in which they supported the country’s 
native language, creating a national intelligentsia and political elite and institutionalizing 
ethnicity into law. Through the 1920s, the Soviet Union encouraged countries across 
                                                
17 Lenin, Vladimir. “Division of the World Among Capitalist Associations.” Imperialism, 
the Highest Stage of Capitalism, 1916. 246–253. 
18 Fisher, Harole H. The Communist Revolution: an Outline of Strategy and Tactics. 
Stanford Univ. Pr., 1985. 
14 
 
Europe and Central Asia to resist imperialist, capitalist influence and stage communist 
revolutions.19 
 Soviet anti-imperialism, however, was tempered by the Soviet Union’s newfound 
status in the bipolar international system after World War II and by Stalin’s death and 
Khrushchev’s ascendance to power in 1953.  The Soviet victory in World War II 
signified that they were no longer a new power trying to find their way into the great 
power geopolitics, but rather in an established position as a world leader. While they 
never abandoned their anti-imperialist beliefs, they recognized the need to coexist with 
western countries despite ideological differences. Even before the end of the war in 1943, 
Stalin dissolved the Comintern in order to avoid agitating the United States and Great 
Britain. In 1956, Khrushchev formally announced the policy known as “peaceful 
coexistence.” Citing the “tremendous changes that have taken place in the world” 
Khrushchev, in his 1959 essay On Peaceful Coexistence, laid out his argument for 
peacefully coexisting with the United States in simple terms: 
You may like your neighbor or dislike him. You are not obliged to be 
friends with him or visit him. But you live side by side, and what can you 
do if neither you nor he has any desire to quit the old home and move to 
another town? All the more so in relations between states. It would be 
unreasonable to assume that you can make it so hot for your undesirable 
neighbor that he will decide to move to Mars or Venus.20 
 
More specifically, Khrushchev defined peaceful coexistence as a “commitment to non-
aggression” and “an obligation on the part of all states to desist from violating each 
other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty in any form and under any pretexts 
                                                
19 Suny, Ronald Grigor. The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union. Stanford Univ. Press, 2004. p. 102. 
20 Khrushchev, Nikita S. “On Peaceful Coexistence.” Foreign Affairs, 19 June 2017. p. 1. 
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whatsoever.”21 Inherent in this view, Khrushchev states, is a rejection of the idea that the 
Soviet Union should “overthrow Capitalism in other countries by means of ‘exporting’ 
revolution,” calling this argument “absolutely unfounded.”22  
The shift to peaceful coexistence in 1950s Soviet policy was in stark contrast to 
China’s ideology. Friedman attributes these disparate priorities to each country’s 
respective experiences, explaining that China’s prior struggles with imperialist 
oppression (with a particular emphasis on the racism associated with their experiences 
with imperialism) pushed them towards a “militant anti-imperialism.”23 This strong 
devotion to anti-imperialism was not simply a position China held, but it was the position 
that helped them rise to global prominence as quickly as they did.  
As the Soviets withdrew into a less aggressive stance of peaceful coexistence, the 
PRC leadership broadcasted to the world the seriousness of their anti-imperialism and 
their willingness to actively fight against it. Prior to the Vietnam War, Mao not only 
preached this revolutionary rhetoric, but the Chinese also backed it up by encouraging 
revolution in a number of third-world countries. For example, the Front for the Liberation 
of Angola (FNLA) unsuccessfully appealed to Moscow and East Berlin for aid to help in 
their struggle, but the Chinese took them seriously and provided economic and military 
aid once the FNLA began discussing Marxism and guerrilla warfare in 1963 and 1964. In 
some respects, the situation in Angola illustrates just how intense China’s devotion to 
anti-imperialism was. Not only did China demonstrate their aggressiveness in taking such 
a big leap by supplying aid to an unproven group, but Jeremy Friedman also noted that 
                                                
21 Ibid. p. 3. 
22 Ibid. p. 5. 
23 Friedman, Jeremy Scott. Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Split and the Third World. 
University of North Carolina Press, 2015. p. 14. 
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China continued to support the FNLA despite their simultaneous clear ties to the United 
States.24 In overlooking these relations with the U.S., Friedman argues that the Chinese 
sent a clear message that they prioritized anti-imperialism above anti-capitalism in the 
third world.25    
The Chinese revolutionary rhetoric, or “Maoist doctrine for revolutionary 
warfare,” was based largely off of Mao’s writings on foreign policy and military strategy 
in the 1930s and 1940s. Mao argued that “the seizure of power by armed force, the 
settlement of the issue by war is the central task and highest form of revolution.”26 Mao 
later stated, “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”27 
China’s militant anti-imperialism, in combination with the Soviet Union’s 
softening stances on imperialism, caused the Chinese to keep a close eye on the Soviet 
Union’s affairs around the world. The PRC was eager to capitalize on the USSR’s 
relatively less aggressive policies against imperialism and contrast these perceived 
weaker stances with their own. For example, the Chinese took serious issue with 
Khrushchev’s conciliatory actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis, issuing a strong 
statement condemning the Soviet retreat, calling them “revisionists” and arguing that this 
behavior was a slap in the face to not only Cubans, but all who had fought against 
imperialism. Beijing argued that the Soviets had abandoned the core Marxist-Leninist 
belief of anti-imperialism in order to selfishly reconcile with the United States. The 
Chinese Embassy in Moscow attacked Khrushchev for backing down from, and therefore 
emboldening, the United States, arguing: 
                                                
24 Ibid. pp. 121-122. 
25 Ibid. p. 122. 
26 "Mao Zedong, Selected Military Writings, p. 267. 
27 Ibid. p. 272. 
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The reason why Khrushchev squandered the favorable situation of anti-
imperialism, even at the expense of revolutionary interests, was his fear of 
war blackmail from American imperialists. He miscalculated the situation, 
[thinking] that the world had already slipped to the verge of a nuclear war, 
and unless concessions were made, all [countries] would perish together.28 
 
The Chinese Embassy warned that Khrushchev’s conciliatory actions in Cuba would 
“feed the arrogance of American imperialism” and that President Kennedy’s prestige had 
been enhanced and would enable him to “demand more concessions in future bargains.” 
The cable concluded with a vilification of the impact of Khrushchev’s actions on the 
Cuban people, arguing that Khrushchev’s actions were “a bowl of cold water, poured 
right over the Cuban people who have been fighting on the front line of the battle against 
the Americans” and that the Soviet “revisionists can by no means be counted on.”29 
Given the USSR and China’s mutual veneration of Marxism-Leninism, China’s 
decision to call the Soviets revisionist was a serious castigation, attacking not only the 
Soviets’ actions in Latin America, but also accusing them of abandoning their core 
beliefs. In 1967, when Polish politician Zenon Kliszko encouraged CCP Secretary Liu 
Ningyi to coordinate aid with other socialist countries to Vietnam, Liu Ningyi berated 
this idea, stating: 
The CCP did not want anything to do with a revisionist clique of the 
Soviet Union's leadership and its lackeys who provide a hypocritical 
support for the Vietnamese nation in its just struggle to save the nation 
against American imperialism, and in fact are betraying it, and who falsely 
come out against the American imperialism [sic], and in fact fulfill the 
role of its ardent helper and supporter. What kind of unity are we then 
talking about here?30 
                                                
28 “Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Moscow, 'Khrushchev’s Reconciliation with the 
United States on the Question of the Cuban Missile Crisis',” October 31, 1962, History 
and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 111-00342-12, pp. 1-3. 
29 Ibid. 
30 “Note from the Conversation between Comrade Zenon Kliszko and CC CCP Secretary 
Liu Ningyi,” June 16, 1967, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Polish 
Central Archives of Modern Records (AAN), KC PZPR, V/84 and XIA/23. 
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These types of anti-Soviet polemics from CCP officials were encouraged 
throughout the Chinese Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution, lasting from May 
1966 until Mao’s death in 1976, was a violent and radical time in Chinese history. 
Seeking to impose his status as a strong leader on all adversaries, Mao turned to writers, 
students, and any active supporter of Maoism to help him bolster his power. Local 
officials and the military became radically Maoist, with the most active supporters, 
known as the Red Guards, working to purge those who disagreed with Mao and educate 
those in the countryside. The initial fervor of the Cultural Revolution intensified China’s 
nationalism and internationalist rhetoric, portraying China as a “center for world 
revolution.” This rhetoric featured frequent attacks against “Soviet revisionism,” 
attacking Soviet leaders for having abandoned the international communist revolution.31 
As the Vietnam War began to escalate in 1964, with increased American 
involvement after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, these conflicting policy shifts began to 
fully manifest themselves on a global stage through China and the Soviet Union’s 
contrasting attitudes and approaches to supporting the North Vietnamese. 
  
                                                
31 Much of the background in this paragraph comes from: Kraus, Richard Curt. The 
Cultural Revolution: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2012. 
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CHAPTER II: THE VIETNAM WAR 
Now the spirit of anti-imperialism is very strong across the whole world, and 
among these anti-imperialist forces, the most powerful is still that of China.32 
-- Le Duan, 1970 
 
 The split between the Soviet Union and China over the intensity of their anti-
imperialist beliefs manifested itself in their respective attitudes and policies toward the 
Vietnam War. Primary source evidence reveals that Soviet leadership, throughout the 
course of the war, were less eager to support an aggressive and offensive North 
Vietnamese military strategy than their Chinese counterparts. The Soviet Union and 
China competed in Vietnam with large sums of economic aid and by giving the DRV 
disparate strategic advice. The PRC also took concrete actions, such as blocking the 
transportation of Soviet aid. This chapter will elucidate how China emerged as a second 
antagonist to the Soviet Union in Vietnam as a result of their geographical advantage, 
their growing influence in Southeast Asia and initial friendship with North Vietnam, and 
their energetic anti-imperialist militancy. 
Conflict in Vietnam formally began in 1945 with Vietnam declaring 
independence from French colonial rule. Lasting until the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu 
in 1954, this decade-long conflict is known as the French-Indochina War. While the 
United States provided France with economic and military aid, it played a peripheral role 
in the conflict. The Soviet Union played a slightly larger part, providing both military aid 
and limited military training to the Vietnamese communists. The Chinese, however, 
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played a more involved and aggressive role, sending two artillery battalions to fight at the 
eventual decisive communist victory at Dien Bien Phu.33 
After a brief period of an uncertain peace following the communist victory, civil 
war erupted in 1957 between the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), along with their 
communist allies in South Vietnam, known as the Vietcong, and the South Vietnamese 
Army (ARVN). Aid from the United States, Soviet Union, and China increased in each 
year to follow, inching each country closer to active participation in the conflict. 
Prior to the American military escalation in 1964, China had supported the DRV 
with more aid than the USSR. China was the first country to recognize the Ho Chi Minh 
government in the DRV diplomatically in 1950, and Mao played a key role in convincing 
Stalin to do the same.34 Lorenz Lüthi, in The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the 
Communist World, explains that China’s aid to North Vietnam was of great importance in 
recovering from the damage it took in fighting France. Lüthi states that much of China’s 
aid consisted of bulk shipments of food, assistance to repair damaged agricultural, 
economic, and transportation infrastructure, and technical specialists.35  
As the conflict intensified, so did the Sino-Soviet ideological rift. In the early 
1960s, the Chinese began to frequently criticize Khrushchev’s policies of non-
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engagement and peaceful coexistence as over-cautious, even naïve.36 Some scholars, like 
Ilya Gaiduk, blame Khrushchev for the fact that the North Vietnamese, in 1963, initially 
allied much more closely with the Chinese than the Soviets.  
Further, Gaiduk stated that the Soviets certainly would have loved to embarrass 
the United States on an international scale, but they perceived Vietnam to be the wrong 
stage to try that on. They perceived too much uncertainty with both the region and with 
North Vietnamese cooperation and, particularly after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, were 
wary of the conflict in Vietnam escalating into direct confrontation with the United 
States.37 Khrushchev, in a 1964 letter to President Johnson following the Gulf of Tonkin 
Incident, warned of “those quarters and persons who do not conceal their desire to 
inflame passions, to pour oil on the flame.”38 The Soviet Union even agreed with the 
United States’ call to take the issue of Vietnam to the United Nations in 1964, to attempt 
to foster diplomatic negotiations between the U.S. and Vietnam.39 
The Soviets’ lack of enthusiasm for full-scale war in Vietnam was best illustrated 
by a conversation between three Polish delegates at the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi in 
September 1964, in which they stated that the “Soviet comrades in general do not share 
the optimism of the Poles [regarding North Vietnam’s chances of success].” The note 
explained that the Soviets were concerned with the National Liberation Front’s (later 
called the Vietcong) shortage of military technology and lack of structured leadership and 
their perception that the U.S. was typically in a position to settle military conflicts to their 
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advantage. The Soviets even predicted that escalation of the war “might lead the U.S. to 
use tactical nuclear weapons,” as “Americans currently need firing ranges for their 
weapons.”40 
Although the Soviets did not and could not publicly admit this, as it would have 
threatened threat their anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist reputation, the USSR often acted as 
an arbitrator between the North Vietnamese and the United States. In 1966, for example, 
the Soviet embassy in Hanoi affirmed its optimism regarding the potential success of a 
negotiated settlement, stating that the DRV should intensify its efforts “to lead the matter 
to a settling of the conflict,” continuing that “all our efforts must be put forth to this 
end.”41 In particular, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin tried multiple initiatives to promote 
talks between the DRV and the United States, as a way for the North Vietnamese to 
consolidate their control over their territory and for the United States to leave Vietnam 
without a total loss.  
Over the subsequent two decades, there were numerous occurrences where the 
Soviets actively pushed both the United States and the North Vietnamese government to 
make compromises to end the war peacefully. In addition to the Soviet Union advocating 
for the Vietnam issue to be discussed in the United Nations Security Council, Soviet 
Ambassador Dobrynin aided in planning, albeit behind-the-scenes, in Operation 
Mayflower in 1965, in which the U.S. ceased bombing in order to attempt negotiations.42 
In 1966, Kosygin appealed to Charles de Gaulle to spearhead efforts for an international 
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conference to resolve the conflict, but the United States rejected this proposal.43 In 1967, 
through Operation Sunflower, the U.S. approached the North Vietnamese via the DRV 
embassy in Moscow as Kosygin and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson worked to 
bring about negotiations.44 
Conversely, the Chinese continually sought to block these Soviet efforts toward a 
negotiated settlement and ensure that the fighting continue until a DRV victory. After 
several foreign policy difficulties in Asia and Africa, Friedman argues that Vietnam took 
on a special significance for the Chinese, as it was their largest (and possibly last, if they 
failed) platform to back up their anti-imperialist rhetoric with successful action.45 A 1968 
telegram from French diplomat Geoffroy Chodron de Courcel confirmed that the Chinese 
knew that the longer and more intense the conflict in Vietnam ran, the risk of Soviet-
American relations collapsing increased. In fact, this telegram went as far to argue that 
the USSR was the “number one enemy” for Mao, which was reflected not only in 
Chinese efforts to minimize Soviet influence in Vietnam, but also in the building tension 
on the border between the “two communist giants.”46 This tension ultimately culminated 
in the 1969 border conflict at Damansky/Zhenbao island, which this thesis analyzes in 
“Chapter IV: Conflict on the Ussuri River.” 
 The Gulf of Tonkin Incident served as the catalyst for the Sino-Soviet competition 
in Vietnam to shift the balance of power in the communist world. On August 2 and 
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August 4, 1964, the USS Maddox was performing a routine signals intelligence operation 
when the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) allegedly attacked the ship.47 The Gulf of 
Tonkin incident justified the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which granted President Johnson 
broad, unilateral power to escalate U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.  
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident and subsequent resolution also affected Soviet and 
Chinese policy towards Vietnam, and toward each other, in two significant ways. First, 
the North Vietnamese did not have the money nor the war materiel to fight the South 
Vietnamese as long as the latter were backed by the United States, just as the South 
Vietnamese did not have the resources to fight the North as long as the USSR and China 
supplied them. The DRV relied on the USSR, most notably for heavy weaponry, as the 
Soviet Union provided almost eighty percent of all military equipment to the DRV from 
1965-1968, including cutting-edge surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft guns, radar, and 
fighter aircraft, including MiG-21’s.48 While China provided significant quantities of 
light weaponry, infrastructure repair experts, and agriculture experts, without China’s rice 
shipments to North Vietnam, Stephen Morris argues, “the civilian population that 
undertook Hanoi’s logistical and economic support work would have been physically 
handicapped in its activities and probably its morale.”49   
Economic competition in aid to the DRV increased, both through the Soviets and 
Chinese increasing aid to Vietnam in an effort to keep up with or surpass that of the 
                                                
47 The accuracy of each of the two reports of attack remain uncertain as a result of the 
darkness, the weather, questions as to the Maddox’s true mission, and ongoing 
uncertainty as to who fired first. 
48 “The Effect of the Vietnam War on the Economies of the Communist Countries.” Issue 
brief no. 70. 1998. 
49 Morris, Stephen J. Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes 
of War. Stanford University Press, 1999. p. 155. 
25 
 
Americans, but also in competition with one another. Below is the data from a 1968 
C.I.A. report, which detailed Soviet and Chinese spending from 1954-1967. Although the 
data does not continue after 1967 and does not include the United States’ spending, it is 
useful in that it provides records from both the USSR and China using the same 
standards. The report divides aid to Vietnam into two categories: 
1. Military aid: Includes the costs of sending men and military materials 
(Roughly half of which was ammunition, along with surface-to-air missiles, 
artillery, aircraft, radar, armor, motor vehicles, small weapons, and infantry 
weapons) 
2. Economic aid: Includes grants to North Vietnam that were not intended to be 
repaid, as well as all “non-military goods” (Including, but not limited to, 
petroleum, trucks and various other automobiles, cotton and silk textiles, and 
food) 
For comparison, the CQ Almanac reported that the Pentagon estimated the U.S. military 
expenditures50 in Vietnam totaled $138.9 billion from 1964 to 1975.51  
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“The Effect of the Vietnam War on the Economies of the Communist Countries” 
CIA Estimates on USSR and China Aid to North Vietnam 
*(in millions of U.S. dollars in the value of 1968) 
**Percentages in parentheses indicate the change from the previous year 
 
Military Aid to North Vietnam 
 Soviet Union China Total 
1954-1964 70 70 140 
1965 210  60  270 
1966 360 (+71.4%) 95 (+58.3%) 455 
1967 515 (+43.1%) 145 (+52.6%) 660 
Total 1,155  370  1,525 
 
Economic Aid to North Vietnam 
 Soviet Union China Total 
1954-1964 365  455 820 
1965 85  50 135 
1966 150 (+76.5%) 75 (+50%) 225 
1967 200 (+33.3%) 80 (+6.7%) 280 
Total 800 660 1,460 
52 
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This data suggests that when China began to establish itself as a legitimate 
adversary to the Soviet Union, the latter was forced to dramatically increase its aid. Not 
only were both countries competing with the United States with their economic aid to 
Vietnam, but they were also competing with one another. It is clear that not only did 
Soviet and Chinese military and economic aid both increase at the same time, but the 
Soviets actually increased their aid at a higher rate from year to year despite having less 
enthusiasm for continuing the conflict than the Chinese. Both sides increased their 
military and economic aid to the DRV in 1965 after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, as well 
as in 1966 and 1967 when the NVA and Vietcong expanded their offensives and a North 
Vietnamese victory appeared more and more possible. These steep spending increases 
illustrate the extent to which the Soviets viewed the Chinese as a threat to their primary 
leadership of the world communist movement. Although the CIA data stops at 1967, 
Gaiduk estimates that the Soviets, in addition to the large sum of aid the above table 
shows, gave $500 million (in the value of 1968 dollars) to the North Vietnamese in 1969 
alone.53  
Most sources note these direct costs when examining the impact of the aid on the 
Soviet economy, but the CIA report explained that there were additional substantial 
indirect costs to the Soviet economy as well. First, the report stated that the Soviet 
economy was damaged by the trade restrictions with the United States. In 1948, the 
United States enacted economic sanctions against the Soviet Union and its allies, hoping 
to hinder their ability to fund weapons programs. The U.S. threatened to strengthen these 
sanctions significantly in 1951 after the outbreak of the Korean War, but ultimately 
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backed down. The U.S. eventually eased these sanctions in the 1970s during the détente 
period between the USSR and the United States.54 The argument from the CIA report, 
therefore, was that U.S. trade with NATO countries increased by 14 percent from 1965 to 
1967 while trade with Eastern Europe remained constant, and the conflict in Vietnam 
may have had some unmeasured cost to the Soviet Union and their Eastern European 
allies by delaying the lifting of the sanctions and preventing an increase in trade during 
these years.55 
The report also cited the indirect costs that came with the military diverting much-
needed resources from the Soviet citizens, claiming that Soviet military spending 
increased by 11 percent between 1965 and 1967, even though the country desperately 
needed more money put into industry, agriculture, and a number of other domestic 
sectors. That is, while every country must balance its military and non-military 
expenditures, the Soviet Union was spending a significantly higher portion of their gross 
national product (GNP) on military expenditures than the United States: between fifteen 
and twenty percent of GNP) from 1950 to 199056, while the U.S. spent 7.6 percent of its 
GNP on military expenditures from 1948 to 1986.57 The 1968 CIA review explained that 
it is impossible to quantify in dollars how much this indirect aid was, but the continuing 
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trade restrictions with the United States and the preemption of money and resources by 
the military were almost certainly more substantial than the direct costs.58  
In noting the significance of the battle for influence in Southeast Asia with the 
Chinese and its financial consequences for the Soviet Union, it is also important to 
consider the Soviets’ reluctance and pessimism associated with this military aid. A staple 
of Khrushchev’s foreign policy doctrine, in line with peaceful coexistence, was that it 
was preferable to extend the Soviet sphere of influence domestically, through propping 
up a nation’s socialist party and providing the resources needed to achieve power and 
steer their country on a path towards socialism and an alliance with the USSR. 
Khrushchev’s threefold increase of Soviet economic aid to developing third-world 
countries from 1958 to 1961 demonstrated that he preferred this more peaceful view to 
spreading Soviet influence through revolutionary violence. In 1961, the Soviets spent 
$2.64 billion towards building many developing countries’ economies, such as India, 
Afghanistan, Egypt, the United Arab Republic, Iraq, Guinea, Ghana, Indonesia, Cuba, 
and Ethiopia, in an attempt to push them towards a “socialist path” of development.59  
The crux of this view was that Khrushchev believed, if given the choice, people in 
newly developed independent states would choose socialism. At a 1959 speech to the 
United Nations General Assembly, Khrushchev touted his policy, stating: 
Let’s compete peacefully and let the peoples judge which system is better, 
which offers greater scope for the development of the productive forces, 
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which provides better for man’s well being. We must respect the choice of 
the peoples. We must respect their right to live as they choose.60 
 
Under this line of thinking, Khrushchev was confident, from the onset of conflict 
in Vietnam up until 1967, that he could help get the United States out of Vietnam through 
negotiations, rather than force, under the pledge that the communists would not invade 
the South. Khrushchev believed, probably correctly so, that if he could successfully 
negotiate America’s exit from Vietnam, the Vietnamese themselves would choose 
socialism. A 1963 Soviet memorandum that analyzed a meeting between U.S. 
Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith and two Polish officials regarding goals for peace in 
Vietnam argued in favor of this strategy, predicting that the Americans would agree to a 
negotiated settlement for a divided Vietnam, thinking capitalism would prevail in the 
south in an election. This memorandum stated, “One must assume that the Americans 
themselves are so shortsighted” to think that a deal would change the communist attitudes 
of the Vietnamese, North and South alike.61  
Soviet leaders believed that if conditions were peaceful in Vietnam, they could 
get the citizens themselves to choose communism over capitalism. From the meeting 
between Galbraith and the Polish officials, the USSR concluded that the U.S. was 
“searching for a way out of the military and political dead-end into which it was led by an 
aggressive policy in Vietnam.” A negotiated U.S. exit, the memorandum argued, would 
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lead to a socialist Vietnam, as the USSR’s “Vietnamese friends have already created a 
flexible program for the gradual unification of the country in stages.” While the 
memorandum does not mention China directly, it concludes by stating, “there is no 
reason to doubt that such a step would lead to the relaxation of international tensions.”62 
That same Soviet memorandum broadly detailed their vision of what would 
happen after successful negotiations would drive the Americans out of Vietnam, 
describing how the economic ideals, trade, science, technology, and culture of North 
Vietnam would spill over into South Vietnam, ultimately causing them to go communist 
too. Once that was complete, the memorandum states that a situation would arise that 
“would allow for the strengthening of DRV influence on South Vietnam and pour 
additional energy into the Vietnamese people’s movement to unite their motherland.”63 
Thus, it was evident that the Soviets had a clearly preferred strategy to spread 
communism to Vietnam and all of Southeast Asia: peaceful economic and cultural 
penetration.  Spending over $1 billion on war materiel, largely for reputational purposes, 
was not in that plan. 
More than just igniting a spending battle between the Soviet Union and China, the 
escalation of the Vietnam War spurred a battle for influence. Both the Soviet Union and 
China stood to benefit economically and militarily from having a communist ally in 
Southeast Asia. From the American perspective at the time, it seemed Ho Chi Minh was 
not just a devout believer in Communism, but that was significantly influenced from 
Moscow. There was some truth to this view, as Ho Chi Minh, prior to 1963, sought to 
keep the war minimal as to avoid escalation with the Americans. This view, while 
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consistent with that of the Soviets, was not imposed on him by the Soviets, but rather Ho 
had made it clear that he fought for Vietnamese independence as his primary motivation, 
rather than spreading world communism. Ho drew inspiration from Woodrow Wilson’s 
discussions of independence, national self-determination, and territorial integrity, even 
for small states. In addition, Ho repeatedly attempted to reach out to American officials 
after the Vietnamese Declaration of Independence on September 2, 1945 to 1948. In this 
period, Ho wrote several letters to President Truman and Secretary of State James Byrnes 
requesting their support in Vietnam’s struggle for independence with France.64 Ho sought 
an independent, unified Vietnam, and believed avoiding serious escalation with the 
United States was the best way to achieve that.  
However, Ho’s opinion was one side of a contested debate within the Workers’ 
Party of Vietnam (WPV). The other side, headed by Party Secretary Le Duan, believed in 
an aggressive strategy of escalating the war; they were less reluctant to accept the 
increase in violence this strategy required. As the leadership of the WPV became younger 
in the 1960s, there existed a significant sect of the party that believed that an aggressive 
and offensive military posture could deter the U.S. and reduce the ARVN’s will to fight, 
leading to a DRV victory and reunification of Vietnam under their rule. Le Duan took 
more inspiration and guidance from Mao than Khrushchev, to the point where he was not 
afraid to criticize Ho’s relatively less aggressive stance. Le Duan did not mince words, 
famously stating, “Uncle Ho wavers…but when I left South Vietnam I had already 
prepared everything. I have only one goal – just final victory.”65 Not only did the United 
States not know of this divide within the party, but President Johnson did not even know 
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who Le Duan was until 1966, after learning from British professor P.J. Honey that 
someone other than Ho Chi Minh may have been pulling the strings in the WPV.66  
Although neither Ho Chi Minh nor Le Duan’s main objectives in the conflict were 
to please the Soviet Union or China, the disparate strategy advice of the two communist 
superpowers was reflected in this divide in North Vietnamese politics. At the Ninth Party 
Plenum in Hanoi on November 22, 1963, the WPV held a vote on whether to carry out 
Ho Chi Minh’s or Le Duan’s preferred strategy. Ken Burns and Lynn Novick, in their 
new docuseries The Vietnam War, explain that after two weeks of bitter debate, Le Duan 
and the younger, more energetically revolutionary leadership group of the WPV won out. 
Ho ultimately abstained from the vote, as he correctly predicted that the party would vote 
to follow Le Duan’s more aggressive strategy.67 Although it remains unknown whether or 
not the Soviets and Chinese were even aware of this vote at the time, this was an early 
victory for the Chinese in their battle for influence in Southeast Asia against the Soviet 
Union.  
It became apparent to the Soviets that China had a great deal of influence over the 
North Vietnamese war strategy. The same 1964 conversation between Polish delegates in 
Hanoi discussed earlier to show the Soviet’s skepticism regarding the military situation in 
Vietnam also revealed that the Soviets were “convinced that the initiators of the [Gulf of 
Tonkin] incident were the Chinese.”68 By making such a confident and bold claim 
without providing any evidence, the Soviets revealed not only the extent to which they 
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viewed the Chinese as overly aggressive, but also the influence they believed China had 
with North Vietnam to carry out such an act.  
While the note did not explain what the Soviets specifically meant in accusing the 
Chinese of “instigating” the Gulf of Tonkin incident, it is noteworthy that they were not 
the only group who believed that China played a role. There is a still unsettled debate in 
Vietnam regarding who gave the order for the North Vietnamese to attack the USS 
Maddox. Ho Chi Minh was reportedly shocked to hear that his small navy fired at 
American ships at the Gulf of Tonkin and demanded that the officer in charge be 
reprimanded for impulsiveness. The North Vietnamese never determined who gave the 
official order to fire, but Huy Duc, a Vietnamese journalist and veteran, expressed the 
belief that Le Duan gave the order, in accordance with his Chinese-backed desire to 
pursue victory through a series of aggressive offensives, rather than a negotiated 
settlement.69 Regardless of who actually gave the order to fire, it was clear from the very 
beginning of the escalation of the Vietnam War that the Soviets believed China had a 
dangerously aggressive agenda and a disturbingly high amount of influence to enact said 
agenda. 
The most direct example of this battle for influence occurred within a year of the 
Gulf of Tonkin Incident, with the Chinese strategically blocking and delaying Soviet 
supplies. A declassified conversation involving an unnamed representative working in the 
International Department of the CPSU accused the Chinese of intentionally blocking 
Soviet weapons and personnel from getting into Vietnam to limit Soviet influence in 
Southeast Asia. The CPSU representative argued that China had no desire to resolve the 
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Vietnam War diplomatically, and was thus limiting Soviet access as both a propaganda 
effort and an effort to prevent political negotiations. The unnamed CPSU representative 
explained that despite the Soviet Union sending “the most modern jet fighter aircraft, 
missiles, and anti-aircraft guns [to Vietnam]… Chinese ‘advisers’ to the general staff of 
the Vietnamese army and to the ministry of defense subvert[ed] the use of Soviet 
weapons.” The representative later accused these Chinese advisers of having the weapons 
“deposited somewhere… or being only partially used for the establishment of Hanoi’s 
defense system.” The representative added that “the U.S., the Soviet Union, and also the 
Vietnamese themselves would move forward toward negotiations, even if [they have] 
different positions and different approaches,” but China’s resistance to negotiation served 
as a roadblock. Regarding China’s blocking of Soviet materiel, the representative 
concluded, “The hands of the Soviet Union are tied to a very great degree. It cannot 
unmask the pernicious policy of the Chinese leadership [of blocking Soviet weapons], 
because Vietnam would suffer most from it, since the Chinese are in a position, and are 
probably willing, to create even bigger difficulties for the Vietnamese.”70  
If they were unable to ship materiel through China, the Soviet Union’s only other 
option to supply resources to Vietnam would be by sea, which was a dangerous option. 
The United States’ Seventh Fleet patrolled the coast of both North Vietnam and South 
Vietnam, frequently engaging in combat operations through air strikes, gunfire support, 
amphibious operations, reconnaissance operations, and mine warfare.71 The U.S. also 
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frequently bombed North Vietnamese ports, increasing the risk of transporting materiel 
by sea. The Seventh Fleet had also effectively blockaded the entire coast of South 
Vietnam, as they quickly discovered that the North Vietnamese were supplying the 
Vietcong in the South via cargo ships along the coast. This blockade forced the North 
Vietnamese to transport troops and resources by land. The result was the creation of the 
Ho Chi Minh Trail (called Route 559 by the North Vietnamese), which connected North 
and South Vietnam by way of Laos and Cambodia.  
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Not only did the U.S. blockade lead to the creation of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but 
it also placed China in a geographical position of power. Passage through China was 
relatively safe from the United States, which was unwilling to provoke China into a 
larger war. If the Soviets were to go by sea, however, confrontation with the United 
States was almost guaranteed, given the heavy American naval presence throughout the 
region. By holding up Soviet military aid and personnel, the Soviets believed that the 
Chinese were hoping to minimize the USSR’s influence in Southeast Asia, which would 
in turn increase China’s influence.  
China’s commitment to convincing the North Vietnamese, along with the entire 
communist world, that the Soviets were not fully committed to the communist effort in 
Vietnam, therefore threatening their status as the singular communist superpower, is seen 
in other examples.  A 1965 note from the East German Embassy in Hanoi on a 
conversation with various ambassadors of socialist countries revealed, “the [Chinese] 
propaganda apparatus is still completely in control of the pro-Chinese forces, which 
intensify their activities and at the moment spread rumors that the Soviet Union is 
delivering outdated weapons.”73 As a part of this goal to increase its influence in 
Southeast Asia, China sought to ensure that the North Vietnamese would not cease 
fighting, as they knew that the Soviets desperately desired a negotiated settlement. The 
Chinese leadership recognized that as the war waged on, the prospect of Soviet-American 
relations improving became slimmer. 
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It is also clear that the North Vietnamese were listening to the Chinese on this 
point. Nguyen Van Vinh, a North Vietnamese general who was also head of the WPV 
Party Committee on Unification, stated in 1966, “What would it mean for us to hold talks 
now? It would mean losing everything, and, first of all, friendship with China which is 
utterly opposed to negotiations.”74  
This view persisted throughout the war, seen later in a 1967 report from the 
Soviet embassy in North Vietnam that revealed that the North Vietnamese would only be 
willing to negotiate a settlement under certain strict conditions: 
1. If they were convinced that the military struggle took a serious turn for the 
worse for them, and their internal situation would not allow them to continue. 
2. If the United States were to give in and agree to satisfy the main demands of 
[North] Vietnam. 
3. If the Chinese, for some reason, were to change their attitude toward the 
Vietnam War. 
4. If soc[ialist] countries were to declare that they could no longer bear the ever 
growing burden of the Vietnam War for internal reasons or owing to dangers 
involved in the protracted and expanded war.75 
Most notable is the third condition, which demonstrated the weight the CCP’s opposition 
to a negotiated settlement carried for the North Vietnamese.  
Beijing’s influence on the North Vietnamese was also seen in a meeting in April 
1967 between Chinese and North Vietnamese leaders, at which the Chinese expressed 
concern about their perception that the Vietnamese were caving in towards a settlement, 
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given the peace talks encouraged by the Soviets between 1965 and 1967. The Chinese 
demanded the Vietnamese make a “solemn promise” to continue the war, at least until 
1968, and the DRV amped up military activity shortly after.76 In doing so, Le Duan 
remarked that the DRV still sought to end the war with “maximal advantages for itself,” 
rather than settle in negotiations.77 This statement indicates that both Le Duan and the 
CCP leadership believed, in 1967, that continued fighting was the best option in order to 
achieve their respective aims in Vietnam. 
At the same time, even though the United States intensified bombing in 1967 and 
negotiations seemed impossible, the Soviet Union did not falter in its desire for a 
diplomatic end to the war. In March 1967, for example, even after U.S. military 
escalation, Soviet diplomat N. P. Kulebiakin continued to suggest to the U.S. Department 
of State “that the time was appropriate for talks between the United States and North 
Vietnam” and that he could help establish a direct line of communication to North 
Vietnam.78 However, the CPSU’s desire for a negotiated settlement seemed to change in 
its motivation. As a North Vietnamese victory began to appear more and more likely, the 
Soviets developed a fear of being left out from the spoils of a DRV victory. In a 
conversation between the Soviet deputy foreign minister and the U.S. ambassador to the 
Soviet Union, the Soviet official maintained a deep paranoia that the Chinese and the 
Americans would negotiate a secret settlement that would leave them and their interests 
out.79  
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China had emerged as a legitimate adversary to the Soviet Union in Vietnam as a 
result of their geographical advantage as it pertained to transportation of materiel, their 
increased strategic influence in North Vietnam, and their energetic anti-imperialist 
militancy. Sino-Soviet competition in Vietnam went as the war went. Once the 
Americans began a serious withdrawal of troops and de-escalation of military activity in 
the early 1970s and a North Vietnamese victory seemed not a question of if, but rather 
one of when, there was not as much room for China and the Soviet Union to directly 
influence strategic decisions. However, Vietnam was in very difficult circumstances after 
the war. The country was depleted economically and torn apart physically.  An entire 
generation had experienced war, with an estimated 1.3 million North and South 
Vietnamese soldiers and two million civilians dead.80 In order for the Vietnamese to 
recover from this devastation, they required heavy support from their “big brothers,” but 
no longer in a military sense. Given this continued need for support, the Sino-Soviet 
competition for influence in Vietnam was not over with the end of the war. The stakes 
and nature of the competition continued, now predicated on which power was best suited 
to aid Vietnam in recovery, and which power the newly independent Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam more closely aligned with. 
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CHAPTER III: INTERKIT (1966-1985) 
 Interkit, a shortened version of the Russian Интернациональное Китаеведение, 
or “International China study,” was a highly secretive organization of heads and deputy 
heads of their respective International Departments, along with China experts from the 
USSR, the Warsaw Pact, and several other allies.81 The subsequent analysis, through use 
of Interkit’s meeting notes and other relevant conversations, will focus on the following 
question: What purpose did the Soviet Union seek for Interkit to have? Essentially, what 
end was gathering China experts from a number of countries supposed to achieve? 
In 1966, while the Vietnam War was still escalating, the Soviets recognized China 
as a developing threat to their global influence. Looking more big-picture than just 
Vietnam, the Soviets sought to address this China problem through funding studies of 
China’s political and social systems, so as to better understand (and therefore critique) 
their leaders as well as to develop effective propaganda to mitigate China’s rise to power. 
Essentially, in 1966, the Soviets made the decision that the threat China posed to them 
had become significant enough that they could no longer continue to simply react to 
China’s aggressive actions, but rather they needed to act preemptively.  
 A key tenet of the Soviet Union’s more active policy towards China was 
collaboration with other socialist countries around the world in an effort to ensure 
continued influence. In 1943, the Soviet Union established the International Department 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The International Department’s chief 
function was to oversee the USSR’s relations with communist governments and parties 
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around the world.82 Two decades later, in 1966, the Soviet Union established the Institute 
of the Far East as a part of the Russian Academy of Sciences, designed to study “social 
and economic development” in China, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea with a focus 
on how those developments would affect relations with the Soviet republics.83 These 
organizations were not secret – that is, they were like the U.S. Department of State, in the 
sense that a portion of their work was classified, but their existences were not hidden 
from the general public.  
 In 1967, the Soviets combined leaders from the International Department and 
the Institute of the Far East to create Interkit.84 The representatives discussed political, 
economic, ideological, cultural, and any other concerns regarding China with the stated 
intention to spread anti-Chinese propaganda targeted specifically against East Asian 
countries.85  Newly translated documents from the Wilson Center Digital Archive that 
detail Interkit’s meetings shed light on the Vietnam War’s negative impact on Sino-
Soviet relations from 1967 onward, as they reveal the Soviet strategy of Eastern bloc 
countries in dealing with the “China question.”  In addition, the documents show that a 
main goal of Soviet and Eastern-bloc anti-China propaganda was to attempt to keep them 
economically isolated to hinder their status as an adversary to the USSR. 
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The existing English-language sources regarding Interkit are limited. Neither the 
Soviet nor the Chinese governments wanted to publicize the details of their contentious 
relations. Both countries’ current governments have been reluctant to open their 
archives.86 For example, the Kremlin announced in 2014 that a series of Soviet security 
archives would remain concealed for an additional thirty years,87 laying out an extensive 
number of broad security-related reasons for these restrictions. Some scholars of Russia 
have critiqued this lack of transparency, claiming the Kremlin is trying to “compose a 
more innocent version of history.”88  
Given the perceived U.S. hegemony that resulted from the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the modern-day Russians and Chinese have sought to find common ground, both 
to form a stable alliance against a perceived U.S. threat and for their own economic 
benefit. Russia and China signed various agreements in the 1990s, as well as agreements 
in 2001 and 2014 that outlined plans for a peaceful alliance and productive economic 
cooperation. It is possible that the Russians are concerned that releasing the history of 
Sino-Soviet tensions could damage this relationship.  
Thus, knowledge of Interkit was unavailable to the public until Poland released 
meeting minutes and relevant conversations related to the organization. Poland was likely 
inclined to release these documents for a variety of reasons. The post-Cold War Polish 
government not only carried a disdain for their years in the Soviet bloc, but also a sense 
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that it was an imposed past, not its own. Additionally, Poland, along with East Germany, 
had some of the most well-kept and protected records of all of the Warsaw Pact countries, 
enabling them to release such information. These two countries provided the bulk of the 
records from the almost-annual Interkit meetings from 1967-1985. 
In February 2011, James Hershberg, Sergey Radchenko, Peter Vamos, and David 
Wolff published the most comprehensive English-language examination of Interkit. 
While the intent of their working paper was to introduce Interkit in a broad sense, as they 
state that it has “received scant scholarly attention,” my thesis will focus on one of their 
working paper’s central questions: “Did [Interkit] actually influence or even shape 
Kremlin policy toward China and perceptions of what was happening there?”89  
Interkit’s method of operation was scholarly analysis, both from the state officials 
and China experts present, of Chinese actions and policies. Released meeting notes show 
that these discussions were Soviet-dominated. An East German report on the 1971 
Interkit meeting in Sofia notes this characteristic:  
The CPSU delegation contributed the bulk of efforts for preparation and 
performance of the meeting. Its contributions and material demonstrated 
high expert knowledge. They analyzed developments scientific-
theoretically and carved out relevant patterns and trends of current 
Chinese policy.90 
 
Thus, although notes from several meetings mention delegations other than the Soviets 
giving presentations, there was no debate or disagreement on any points. Rather than 
being a collaborative effort to create substantive policy to attempt to solve the “China 
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question,” Interkit meetings more often resembled lectures given by the Soviet 
delegation, in which they harped on all of the negative qualities of China and the CCP.  
The first Interkit meeting was held December 14-21, 1967. Representatives from 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, and 
Poland joined the USSR in Moscow for what was largely an introductory gathering, 
consisting mainly of discussing the Soviets’ top concerns with China. These Soviet 
concerns were: (1) Chinese build-ups along the Sino-Soviet border, (2) Chinese- 
produced anti-Soviet propaganda, and (3) Soviet concerns over what they described as 
Mao’s belligerent nature. The Soviets framed the need to keep China’s aggressiveness in 
check as synonymous with the “defense of Marxism-Leninism, the unity of the 
communist world movement, and cooperation with the national-revolutionary liberation 
movement”91 Although the meeting notes did not explicitly mention Vietnam, the timing 
of this third concern over Mao’s aggressiveness coincides with the Soviet’s frustrations 
with China’s influence in preventing negotiations and increasing the bellicosity of the 
North Vietnamese.   
In a 1966 conversation in Moscow, de-facto Polish leader Władysław Gomułka 
and Brezhnev discussed “the war in Vietnam, as well as the whole situation in China and 
the CCP’s position (Gomułka’s words).” Gomułka expressed concern over the Soviets’ 
stated perception that China strongly influenced North Vietnam. He was especially 
worried that “Mao’s idea of the guerilla army is currently being implemented and carried 
out in Vietnam.” Brezhnev agreed, stating:	
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We fully agree with your opinion that we need to know the real position 
and aims of the policy conducted by the Vietnamese Workers’ Party. 
However, so far we have not been able to achieve anything on this end. 
We see the reflection of their dependence on the Chinese. We have done a 
lot to persuade the Vietnamese to sensible negotiations.92 
 
Brezhnev concluded the conversation by declaring that “the Chinese problem must be 
investigated,” as neither the Soviet nor Polish leadership knew of the CCP’s internal 
political stability, nor of the extent to which they influenced the DRV.93 In this regard, 
Chinese influence in North Vietnam played a motivating role in the establishment of 
Interkit. 
Each meeting describes detailed conversations on how the threats from China 
were changing, but much of the notes are devoid of any action. For example, in Sofia in 
1971, the East German meeting notes revealed that Interkit critiqued the Chinese policy 
known as “differentiation,” which Interkit defined as “support for any forces working 
toward the overthrow of the existing order in the Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries.”94 A Polish note from a 1978 meeting between the International Departments 
of eight socialist countries in Budapest provided some examples of Chinese 
“differentiation”: 
They are using a growing number of methods such as: economic intrigues 
and an intensified policy of differentiation toward socialist countries. They 
are giving economic credits to Korea, Romania, and Yugoslavia, while 
conducting an intensive differentiation policy toward Vietnam, instigating 
Cambodia, and posing territorial claims to Vietnam. Therefore, this is a 
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selective approach [in their relations with] socialist countries, an approach 
based on the Maoist theory of “the Third World.” By doing all of the 
above, Beijing aims to eliminate the Comecon and the Warsaw Pact – two 
organizations which it views as the tools of “the Soviet reign.”95 
 
 At the same time that the Chinese were blocking the transportation of Soviet 
weapons to Vietnam and slandering Soviet policies to their North Vietnamese allies in an 
attempt to weaken the USSR’s relationship (and therefore their influence) with North 
Vietnam, China had a similar goal to the USSR’s Eastern bloc allies. Through this policy 
known as “differentiation,” China sought to exploit any potential point of contention 
between the USSR and any of their allies, in an attempt to lessen Soviet influence 
throughout the world. This policy was the focus of multiple Interkit meetings, 
demonstrating the level of seriousness with which the Soviets took the threat of this 
Chinese policy.  
In attempting to analyze the main objective and outcomes of Interkit, it is crucial 
to examine the most influential member of the organization, Oleg Rakhmanin. 
Rakhmanin was the Deputy Director of the International Department for Relations with 
Fraternal Countries and the head of the Soviet delegation to Interkit. His personal 
influence was significant, and he adamantly believed that China was an immediate threat 
to the Soviet Union that must be dealt with seriously. For example, in a June 1974 
meeting Rakhmanin led, he spoke to eight Eastern bloc delegations, describing the 
situation with China as “dangerous,” warning the group of the Chinese troops on the 
Sino-Soviet border and even claiming the existence of a “Chinese community in the 
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USSR which acts on behalf of Maoist China.”96 As a further illustration of the extent of 
Rakhmanin’s distrust of the Chinese, when Sino-Soviet relations were improving in 
1980, Rakhmanin was not at all convinced, claiming that the Chinese were only 
pretending to sympathize with the Soviet Union over the Solidarity crisis in Poland in 
order to take advantage of them.97  
As Sino-Soviet relations improved in the 1980s, Rakhmanin’s distrust never 
wavered. On March 24, 1982, Brezhnev gave a speech in Tashkent, in which he recalled 
a time when “the Soviet Union and People’s China were united by bonds of friendship 
and comradely co-operation.” After clarifying multiple times that the Soviet Union never 
considered hostility against the Chinese, Brezhnev continued: “We are prepared to come 
to terms, without any preliminary conditions, on measures acceptable to both sides to 
improve Soviet-Chinese relations.”98 The working paper on Interkit described Rakhmanin 
as “distraught” upon hearing that the Soviets were attempting to mend their relationship 
with the Chinese.99 Rakhmanin continued his efforts to warn both Eastern bloc nations 
and the Soviet Union about the seriousness of the Chinese threat, writing an 
“exceptionally hard-line” anti-China article in Pravda in 1985 without permission, which 
earned him an internal investigation with the Politburo and the loss of any power he still 
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had. In 1986, the East Germans and Poles began discussions of economic agreements 
with the Chinese, thus rendering Interkit useless.100 
This analysis suggests two related points. First, Interkit’s method of operation was 
to perform scholarly analyses on China. Meetings operated as more of a Soviet-led 
discussion of these analyses, rather than concrete plans for action. Second, especially 
after the Vietnam War, there was a clear disconnect between the Interkit leadership and 
the Soviet government, evidenced by Oleg Rakhmanin’s being kept out of the loop 
regarding Brezhnev’s shift in policy towards China and Rakhmanin’s polemical critique 
of China in the face of the new Soviet policy. These two conclusions, in combination 
with each other, suggest that Interkit was not designed to have a significant impact on 
Soviet policy. While there was some coordinated propaganda efforts conducted through 
Interkit, it was not the case that other delegations presented their findings on China to be 
reflected in Soviet policy towards China.   
Rather, Interkit gave the Soviet delegation, led by Oleg Rakhmanin, whom the 
Soviet government knew was steadfastly anti-China, a platform to disseminate these anti-
Chinese beliefs to dissuade countries in Interkit from doing any sort of business with 
China, as doing so would not only aid the Chinese economically, but also increase their 
international influence. Hershberg and his colleagues revealed that in 1973, the Soviet 
delegation to Interkit initiated a coordinated bloc-wide economic-trade policy towards 
China, with the intent to “ prevent the PRC from gaining advantages from individual 
countries.”101 Especially after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, the Soviets used Interkit to 
continue to “keep a tab on what other socialist countries were doing in relations with 
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China, lest Moscow’s allies became tempted to bury the hatchet of anti-Chinese 
sentiment in Mao’s coffin.”102 A 1977 East German record of a talk with CPSU official 
Boris Kulik, in preparation for the ninth Interkit meeting, stated that the Soviet delegation 
had an eighty-page comprehensive report prepared for the meeting that was set to argue 
that the new Chinese leadership was “just a continuation of Maoist policy” and that the 
CCP remained Maoist, not Marxist-Leninist. However, the report did note that some 
things had changed with Mao’s death, notably that the new CCP leadership was looking 
to find “new methods to steer the economy” and that “Chinese representatives are making 
more efforts to establish contacts with diplomats from socialist fraternal countries.”103 
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CHAPTER IV: CONFLICT ON THE USSURI RIVER 
104 
105 
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A series of border clashes throughout the 1960s characterized the Sino-Soviet 
relationship, each of which was the culmination of years of building tension. The Sino-
Soviet border clashes were important because they demonstrated that tensions between 
the USSR and PRC had been so badly damaged through the 1960s that they engaged in a 
prolonged, deadly conflict over an island, less than two kilometers in length, that carried 
no strategic value. Not only did the timing of the conflict coincide with the escalating 
tensions in Vietnam, but American primary source documents also revealed that the 
Soviets feared that the Chinese would become increasingly aggressive in Vietnam as a 
result of the 1969 Damansky/Zhenbao Island conflict. 
First, on March 2, 1969, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attacked 
the Soviet Far East Border Guards on a small island along the Ussuri River on the Sino-
Soviet border that the Soviets called Damansky Island (Russian: Остров Даманский) 
and the Chinese called Zhenbao Island. A 1970 CIA intelligence report stated that it was 
“more likely that the ambush was directly ordered by Peking,” rather than a breach of 
discipline or a regional command.106 After some intense fighting, the Soviets reclaimed 
the island.  
Just days later on March 15, the Soviets reported that the Chinese Army launched 
a more coordinated attack on Damansky/Zhenbao Island, beginning with an artillery 
attack, followed by a 5,000-man invasion. However, while details of the March 15 
conflict remain scarce, CIA analysts believed it likely that the Soviets initiated the attack 
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as retaliation, and that no such Chinese first strike happened.107 The 1970 CIA report 
stated that “Soviet leadership decided to hit hard at Chinese forces.” The report redacted 
the specific names or agencies that gave the order, but it stated that KGB guards were 
secretly sent to Damansky/Zhenbao Island in white camouflage during the night, later to 
be joined by a number of Soviet tanks.108 The Soviet Union sought to retaliate not only to 
defend the island, but also to send a strong message to the Chinese to cease any potential 
future attack plans by firing a massive barrage of artillery at the Chinese side of the river. 
Ultimately, the Soviet Border Guards killed “several hundred” PLA troops on March 15, 
1969.109 
Two days later, on March 17, the Soviet border guards returned to 
Damansky/Zhenbao Island in an attempt to recover a T-62 tank that had been disabled by 
the Chinese. Although a seemingly innocuous task, recovery of the T-62 tank carried an 
extra significance, as this was the first instance in which the Soviets deployed it in battle, 
and they therefore sought to maintain the secrecy of its existence. The Soviets failed to 
recover the T-62 tank after coming under Chinese fire and failed to destroy the tank on 
March 21 for the same reason, and it eventually fell into the Chinese’s hands. Fighting 
ceased after March 21, but the border dispute was not officially resolved until 1991.  
The Central Committee of the CPSU sent a report to East German leadership after 
the March 2 conflict, beginning by voicing their view that this Chinese attack was long 
premeditated, with the Chinese having increased troops in that region and violated the 
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border at Damansky/Zhenbao multiple times within months of the conflict. The report 
proceeded to clarify that it was not Chinese border guards that initiated the conflict, but 
rather a trained unit from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. The report cited that the 
Chinese unit that initiated the March 2 attack was equipped with “special gear,” including 
camouflaged clothing, a secure line of communication to the Chinese shore, PAC 
batteries, mines, armored artillery, heavy fire guns, and grenade splinters.110 In listing 
these capabilities, the Soviet report distinguished this attack from the other “several 
thousand border violations with provocative goals” since 1960.111 The 1969 conflict at 
Damansky/Zhenbao Island was not another impulsive border skirmish, but it was rather a 
calculated attack. Thus, the question arose: Why did the Chinese plan and carry out an 
attack on an island that contained no economic or strategic value?  
The Soviets were very clear in answering this question. They strongly believed 
that Mao Zedong sent a well-trained armed unit to provoke them in order to produce a 
“chauvinist frenzy in [China], creating an atmosphere which enables them to establish 
Mao Zedong’s anti-Soviet and chauvinist great power course as the general line of 
Chinese policy”112 This explanation also helps understand the timing of the Chinese 
aggression. The Ninth Congress in China was coming up in 1969, which provided Mao 
and the Chinese Communist Party a platform to further their anti-Soviet meta-narrative as 
a strategy to extend their sphere of influence as the top communist power.   
                                                
110 “Soviet Report to East German Leadership on Sino-Soviet Border Clashes,” March 
02, 1969, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAMPO-BArch J IV 
2/202/359. Translated by Christian F. Ostermann. 
111 Ibid. 
112 “Soviet Report to East German Leadership on Sino-Soviet Border Clashes,” March 
02, 1969, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAMPO-BArch J IV 
2/202/359. 
56 
 
It is also important to note that the Chinese account of the events at 
Damansky/Zhenbao Island do not align with the description above. Yang Kuisong, a 
Chinese historian who specializes in the Chinese Communist Party, translated Chinese 
documents released in the late 1990s to reveal the Chinese perception of the events on the 
Ussuri River in March 1969. The Chinese reports following the battle on March 2 
claimed that Chinese border patrol was sent to do defensive duties on the island, which 
they clearly believed was rightfully their own, when “the Soviet revisionists discovered 
them,” dispatched one truck, two armored vehicles, one command car, and 70 soldiers, 
surrounding the Chinese, and then proceeded to ignore the Chinese’s warnings and fire 
on them.113  
The Chinese report focused extensively on the March 15 fighting, which the 
Soviet troops initiated, praising the preparedness of the Chinese Army for a second attack 
from the Soviets. The Chinese government promoted the narrative that the Soviet 
revisionists (a term consistent with Chinese perceptions of the Soviet Union through the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution) launched an attack on the defensive Chinese Army, but the 
Chinese held their ground. To their Romanian allies, the Chinese claimed the Soviets 
were acting aggressively on the border in order to “intimidate China, internationally 
portraying China as the aggressor and convincing the Soviet people of the Chinese 
threat.”114 In spreading this narrative, Mao Zedong publicly announced through Chinese 
propaganda that China should be ready “to fight a great war, an early war, and even a 
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nuclear war…this year or at any time in the future,” possibly even a war deep into 
Chinese territory.115  
After some additional small skirmishes along the Sino-Soviet border, conflict 
broke out again on the western part of the Sino-Soviet border in August 1969 near the 
Chinese Xinjiang region, near Kazakhstan. Soviet troops ambushed and killed 38 Chinese 
soldiers, with the intent, according to Boris Davydov, a KGB officer disguised as a 
diplomat, of sending a clear message to CCP leadership that “that they couldn’t continue 
to get away with” provocations on the border.116 Lyle Goldstein explained that attacking 
at this location was strategic to send a serious message to the CCP, as China believed 
itself to be vulnerable to attack in that area.117 
In that same month, the Chinese Communist Party laid out more concrete orders 
for mobilization on the border. Despite ordering the PLA troops not to attack the Soviets 
unprovoked, the orders contained permissive rules of engagement, prefaced with a 
statement intended to further engrain the anti-Soviet attitudes stemming from the Cultural 
Revolution. After stating that China had achieved great victories in the Cultural 
Revolution and the state of the country was “united” and “excellent,” the order warned: 
The U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists are stepping up their 
collusion and are plotting to encroach upon our great motherland. The 
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socialist imperialists of Soviet revisionism are ever more frenziedly and 
persistently carrying out armed provocations on our border.118 
 
Statements like these sought to portray a situation in which China was in a position of 
international power, economic strength, and social stability. These statements attacked 
the Soviets as imperialists and revisionists to promote the Chinese’s superior values and 
dedication to their ideology. These statements were also consistent with the findings of 
both the Soviet Union and, years later, the CNA Institute for Public Research. Mao 
sought to use the conflict at Damansky/Zhenbao Island to rile up nationalistic, anti-Soviet 
attitudes, both amongst PLA troops and Chinese citizens, as part of his goal to establish 
China as a third great power through aggressive action.  
 In addition to examining China’s motives in the 1969 border clashes, analyzing 
the role of the conflict at Damansky/Zhenbao island in the larger context of Sino-Soviet 
history begs the question: Why 1969? That is, while China had frequently declared the 
1860 Treaty of Peking “unequal,” why did they elect in 1969 to act militarily? 
Additionally, why did the Chinese not initiate the conflict at the peak of the “Sino-Soviet 
split,” which scholars typically define as 1962-1963? 
 The timing of the clash on the Ussuri River was not coincidental: China’s claim 
that the 1860 Treaty of Peking was a “treaty forced upon a weak China by czarist 
Russia”119 makes the critical assumption that China had since achieved a comparable 
level of power to the Soviet Union. While there is no accessible Chinese primary source 
to explicitly tell what factors led to this perceived international power, the 1970 CIA 
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report argued that Mao made a calculated risk at Damansky/Zhenbao Island to harness 
“anti-Soviet energies,” stating: 
Mao’s purpose was not to attain a victory for internal use or to blacken the Soviet 
image internationally, but rather to assert his claim to the island. In wiping out a 
Soviet border guard detachment, he gambled that the Russians would not escalate 
either by launching a big ground-force or conventional air attack or by attacking 
with nuclears. He apparently hoped that the Russians would not respond at all 
militarily because the Chinese claim to Chen Pao was so clearcut.120 
 
While there were skirmishes along the Sino-Soviet border throughout the 1960s, 
the major clashes in 1969 differed in that they were premeditated and more deadly. The 
1970 CIA report noted that the Damansky/Zhenbao Island conflict was the first time in a 
Sino-Soviet border clash that the People’s Liberation Army used mortars, grenade-
launchers, and anti-tank guns against the Soviet border guards. In the midst of the 
Vietnam War, Sino-Soviet tensions had reached the point of violence, with the CCP 
leadership seeking to rile up anti-Soviet attitudes consistent with their efforts in the 
Cultural Revolution, and the Soviet leadership seeking to not only fend off Chinese 
aggression, but send a clear message that it would not be tolerated. 
The Nixon Administration also had a decision to make regarding the official 
American stance on the Sino-Soviet conflict. Deputy National Security Advisor William 
G. Hyland, in a 1969 memorandum to Henry Kissinger, explained the debate within the 
U.S. government as between “strict impartiality” or “shading toward China.” However, 
Hyland suggested that shading toward the Soviet Union and expressing a willingness to 
accept a Soviet attack on China “might just be the way to an early Vietnam 
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settlement.”121 However, Hyland’s theory that siding with the Soviets would lead the 
USSR to achieve a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, in addition to overestimating the 
USSR’s influence in North Vietnam, was not a common view within the U.S. 
government.122 State department academic consultants, as shown in a 1969 memorandum 
from State Department official Miriam Camps to Under Secretary of State Elliot 
Richardson, warned against Hyland’s claim that “a Sino-Soviet war, for a limited period 
and if limited in scope, is by no means a disaster for the U.S.”123 The consultants 
explained that a Soviet attack on China would have “a vast destabilizing effect” 
throughout Asia and Western Europe, additionally warning that an attack “would result in 
strengthening Chinese nationalism and unity, and would solidify Mao’s position.”124 
The USSR was also concerned about the potential Vietnam implications of Mao’s 
aggression against the Soviet Union, particularly in the March 2 conflict at Damansky 
Island. In a June 1969 conversation between Director of the Office of Research and 
Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific John Holdridge and Soviet diplomat Yuri Linkov, 
Holdridge reported that Linkov inquired whether Holdridge believed that China would 
attack the USSR on a larger scale and what the U.S. reaction to a Sino-Soviet war would 
be. Despite dismissing it multiple times, Holdridge explained that Linkov repeatedly 
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“raised…the question of possible Chinese Communist intervention in Vietnam.”125 In an 
August 1969 conversation, Soviet diplomat Boris Davydov probed Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research Vietnam Expert William L. Stearman on similar questions regarding the 
possibility of a Sino-Soviet war. After discussing the Damansky Island conflict, Davydov 
stated that the Soviet Union was “still interested in letting the U.S. withdraw from 
Vietnam in a manner which will not leave it bitter and angry,” but that China demanded a 
“rapid and complete withdrawal of U.S. forces… and [the United States’] agreement to a 
coalition government [in Vietnam],” despite knowing that these conditions were not 
acceptable to the United States in 1969.126 This, in turn, also demonstrated the Soviet 
Union’s fear over a potential direct Chinese intervention in Vietnam after their 
aggressiveness on the Sino-Soviet border. 
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CHAPTER V: SINO-SOVIET-VIETNAMESE POST-WAR RELATIONS  
“After all these years, the Vietnamese had learned to live with crises and war, but 
they haven’t learned yet to live as a nation.”127 
-- Extracted from Ken Burns and Lynn Novick’s The Vietnam War 
 
Post-war Vietnam, rather than repaying favors or taking orders from either the 
Soviet Union or China, focused on unifying, rebuilding, and developing both halves of 
the country under a socialist model. They also began to establish the new Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam as a legitimate regional power. While Vietnam needed significant 
foreign aid to achieve these goals, it had also clearly expressed a desire to conduct its 
internal politics independent of foreign influence, which was not compatible with Mao’s 
revolutionary-war, interventionist international doctrine.  
In and of itself, the North Vietnamese military victory only benefitted the 
Vietnamese. The battle between the Soviet Union and China carried on. In the Soviet 
Union and China’s attempts to use the North Vietnamese victory to bolster their 
international reputations because of their shared beliefs in communism, the Chinese 
severely overestimated the amount of loyalty they had won from North Vietnam. While 
North Vietnamese leaders, notably Le Duan, praised the Chinese throughout the war and 
took strategic advice and inspiration from them, the newly unified Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam was incapable of repaying any favors after the war, as at least 25 percent of their 
national budget in 1977 budget depended on foreign aid.128  
The Vietnamese showed that rather than provide the USSR or China with 
outspoken political support to bolster their perceived geopolitical power, they focused on 
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becoming an independent regional power in Indochina. While Vietnam may still have 
depended on foreign aid after the end of the war, it did not want foreign powers to dictate 
its own domestic and international policies. The leadership of the newly unified Vietnam 
had made it clear that they owed no favors to China, as they sought to become their own 
power. Truong Nhu Tang, in his famous book, A Vietcong Memoir, explained part of the 
Vietnamese rationale behind this Vietnamese belief: “What was the point of freeing 
ourselves from American neocolonialist visions…in order to enroll as pawns?” Tang 
continued to explain that any energy the Vietnamese spent appeasing the Soviet Union or 
China would have been a waste of effort that should have been used for internal 
reconstruction.129 The shift in Vietnamese policies after independence precipitated an 
adverse reaction from CCP leadership, both before and after Mao’s death in September 
1976.  
Although the Vietnam War did not officially end until April 1975, when the North 
Vietnamese overran Saigon and helicopters famously evacuated the last Americans, the 
war had been approaching its finish for years. As early as December 1969, President 
Nixon remarked in a news conference that “we can see that the Vietnam War will come 
to a conclusion regardless of what happens at the bargaining table.”130 Especially after the 
news broke in the United States of American soldiers’ unjustified massacre of unarmed 
Vietnamese civilians in the village of Mỹ Lai in March 1968, which led to twenty-five 
indictments in the military (and controversially only one guilty sentence), it was evident 
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that not only was an American victory in Vietnam looking less plausible by the day, but 
also that the American public could no longer support war in Vietnam.  
From the Soviet perspective, the U.S. drawing down its forces in Vietnam through 
Nixon’s policy of “Vietnamization” had both positive and negative ramifications. Sino-
Soviet competition in Vietnam became less intense, as there was no longer room for 
debate regarding North Vietnamese military strategy. But it was also the case that the 
bellicose “Chinese path,” which Le Duan followed, characterized by many offensive 
attacks, had succeeded to a large extent. As the United States gradually left Vietnam, 
North Vietnamese forces advanced into the south with a series of offensives, which the 
South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) could not deter, making a communist victory 
imminent.  
Post-war Vietnam faced a steep path to recovery and stabilization. The country 
was depleted economically and torn apart physically, with an entire generation having 
experienced war. An estimated 1.3 million North and South Vietnamese soldiers and two 
million civilians died on both sides, not including those killed in the First Indochina War 
from 1946 to 1954.131 This devastation required the Soviet Union to continue to provide 
as much aid for as long as they could, as the battle for influence in Southeast Asia turned 
a new chapter. The communists had achieved territorial victory on the battlefield, but 
Vietnam now needed to be developed, politically and industrially. Vietnam was an 
agrarian state whose farmland had been destroyed and polluted in the war, and the 
economy in the south was now without its previous backbone: the United States.  
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 The bulk of available English-language primary sources regarding the Sino-
Soviet-Vietnamese triangle in the 1970s come from conversations between Chinese and 
Vietnamese officials, in which the Vietnamese consistently reiterated their praise for 
Mao, the inspiration they drew from China, and their stated neutrality between the Soviet 
Union and China. Stephen J. Morris’s “The Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese Triangle in the 
1970s,” however, provides analyses of the limited number of Russian-language sources, 
which reveal increasing tensions throughout the 1970s between China and Vietnam 
stemming from disagreements on various international issues. 
Morris explains that the North Vietnamese leadership shifted strategic thinking in 
1968, when victory seemed more likely. They were no longer thinking in primarily 
military terms, but they also began to speak of political and diplomatic aims.132 While the 
Vietnamese still refused to publicly side with either the Soviet Union or China, this 
change in focus laid the groundwork for future Sino-Vietnamese tension, as it was in 
these latter two categories where Chinese doctrine failed. That is, while Mao’s doctrine 
of revolutionary warfare was largely successful in leading to North Vietnam capturing 
Saigon and winning the Second Indochina War, it was devoid of any effective peacetime 
state building strategies, which the Vietnamese then needed. 
To describe the Vietnamese viewpoints as a rigid dichotomy between pro-Soviet 
forces and pro-Chinese forces would not only be an oversimplification, but it would also 
denigrate the Vietnamese leadership. Morris demonstrated that the factions that existed 
within the WPV in the late 1960s and early 1970s did not line up perfectly as pro-Soviet 
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versus pro-Chinese. Rather, they varied by issue and signified a broad “Soviet tilt,” rather 
than the North Vietnamese actively choosing the Soviet Union over China.133 
Morris argues that there was a sequence of geopolitical stances taken by the North 
Vietnamese leading up to 1975, on which Vietnam could have remained neutral but chose 
to take a stance. Morris listed the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Soviet-West 
German détente, the attempted coup d’état in Sudan, the coup d’état in Portugal, and the 
Civil War in Angola as five major points of contestation between the Soviet Union and 
China in which the Vietnamese could have remained neutral or not said anything but 
chose to instead make “a public stand in support of the Soviet line.”134  
Additionally, Morris explains that North Vietnam was upset with both China and 
the Soviet Union over hosting President Nixon for talks in 1972, but the Soviet Union 
made a serious effort to send delegations to North Vietnam after Nixon’s visit to reaffirm 
relations.135 These Soviet efforts were successful in ameliorating any tension created by 
the Nixon visit to Moscow. In 1973, the Soviet embassy in Hanoi reported a 
strengthening in their relationship with “the Vietnamese comrades.” In that year, the 
Soviet Union forgave $1.08 billion in debt from previous aid and provided North 
Vietnam with 132.7 million rubles (roughly $2.34 million) in both credit and grants, 
along with 10 million rubles (roughly $176,000) in free aid.136 
However, while the Soviets had repaired any damage done to their relations with 
the Vietnamese, the Chinese were vocally upset about Vietnam’s disagreement on the 
variety of foreign policy issues listed above. For example, Vietnam publicly supported 
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the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968,137 while Zhou Enlai likened the Soviet 
invasion to Hitler’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938, the U.S. invasion of Vietnam, 
and Japanese imperialism in China.138 China’s frustrations culminated in a secret Sino-
Vietnamese meeting in September 1975 in China, with Le Duan leading the Vietnamese 
delegation. Morris notec that the subsequent report on the meeting was never published, 
but the Vietnamese provided an account of the meeting to the Soviets in October of that 
year. While the document stated that the Vietnamese came to China to strengthen mutual 
relations, China “openly and officially” scrutinized Vietnam’s closeness with the Soviet 
Union, warning that continuation of this policy would result in China cutting off support. 
The Vietnamese, according to the report, stood by their policy decisions and concluded 
the report describing the condition of Sino-Vietnamese relations as “alarming” and 
“critical.”139 
In the second half of 1975, China’s material assistance to Vietnam declined 
significantly. At the beginning of 1976, China began to recall specialists and delay work 
on recovery projects in Vietnam. The Vietnamese expressed concerns to the Soviets that 
the Chinese might use territorial disputes in the Tonkin Gulf and/or the Parcel and 
Spartley Islands as a platform to act on their anger with the Vietnamese. However, the 
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Vietnamese message to the Soviet Union noted that they still sought to repair relations 
with China rather than work solely with the Soviet Union.140  
The Fourth Vietnamese Party Congress in December 1976 proved to be a critical 
juncture in the course of not only Vietnamese politics but also Sino-Vietnamese relations. 
The party removed many of the remaining pro-Chinese leaders. Economic socialization 
efforts in the south targeted the urban class, and by association, the Chinese community 
living there. Vietnam also chose to adopt a more militant stance regarding border tensions 
with the Khmer Rouge-controlled territory in Cambodia known as Kampuchea to remove 
Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot. Vietnamese leadership sought to replace the Khmer Rouge, 
the Cambodian communists that won the Cambodian Civil War in 1975, with a 
government more friendly to Vietnam and less reliant on violence, thereby increasing 
Vietnam’s security.141  This angered CCP leadership, which had financially supported the 
Khmer Rouge since its inception in 1968, funding the Khmer Rouge’s insurgency and 
sending thousands of technicians to help until Pol Pot’s regime eventually took over 
Cambodia in 1975.142 In February 1977, China formally notified Vietnam that they were 
unable to continue to provide aid for Vietnam’s reconstruction. At the same time, China 
increased its financial and technical assistance to Kampuchea, a direct threat to the 
Vietnamese.  
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In efforts to establish themselves in the international arena, Vietnam became an 
official member of the United Nations in September 1977 and in the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (COMECON) in May 1978. China subsequently eliminated all 
remaining funding to Vietnam. Vietnam and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation in November 1978, which demonstrated Soviet solidarity 
with Vietnam. The treaty also warned China regarding its support for Kampuchea against 
Vietnam and their increased presence on the Sino-Vietnamese border. Vietnam 
proceeded to invade Cambodia in December of the same year, with the primary 
motivation of removing the Khmer Rouge from power in favor of a government more 
sympathetic to Vietnam.143 Since 1975, China provided at least 90 percent of the Khmer 
Rouge’s foreign aid in hopes that they would serve as a strong ally in Indochina with 
Vietnam allying with the Soviet Union. China was “furious” with the Vietnamese 
invasion, and the People’s Liberation Army proceeded to invade Vietnam across a broad 
front, to “teach Vietnam a lesson,” in February 1979.144 Following the 1979 conflict, six 
clashes along the border occurred between 1980 and 1988. Both sides claimed victory in 
the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, and the conflict made clear that Sino-Vietnamese 
relations had reached an irreparable point. 	
Rather than use their role in the war to build a strong alliance with Vietnam to 
increase their international power, the CCP viewed their strong military support for the 
North Vietnamese as sufficient in and of itself for gaining international credibility. Pao-
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min Chang, in “Beijing, Hanoi, and the Overseas Chinese,” explained, “the communist 
victory in the south apparently led the Chinese to believe that [Vietnam] now had behind 
them a powerful protector, China; they therefore expected more respect from the 
Vietnamese.”145  
Maoist doctrine, it seems clear in retrospect, was focused too narrowly on 
aggressive military tactics and not on state and economy building. As a result, Mao’s 
successor, Deng Xiaoping, renounced the Cultural Revolution after taking office in 1977, 
critiqued Mao as “seven parts good, three parts bad.”146 Along with significant economic 
reforms, Deng also established an “open door policy,” seeking to expand contact and 
trade with the rest of the world. However, despite Deng’s significant reforms, tensions 
with the Vietnamese leadership had blown up so badly as a result of China’s perception 
that the Vietnamese had “chosen” the Soviets over them. These tensions manifested 
themselves in the 1979 attack. While the 1979 attack itself lasted roughly four weeks, 
China and Vietnam did not ultimately resolve the border issue until the Treaty of Land 
Border in Hanoi on December 31, 1999.147 
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CONCLUSION  
“Reliance on lessons of the past tends to be particularly marked during crises. The 
stress and imperfect information associated with crisis decision-making frequently 
lead policy-makers to rely on the past to illuminate the present.”148 
Ret. Gen. David Petraeus, 1987 
 
Central to this paper’s arguments is a rejection of the “Cold War mindset” that the 
Vietnam War was predominantly a battle between communists and capitalists to 
determine if Vietnam were to look like the United States or the Soviet Union. In fact, to 
view the Vietnam War as a proxy war between the United States and the Soviet Union 
ignores many fundamental aspects of the conflict. A complete analysis of the Vietnam 
War should view the war as an event embedded in international systems, rather than 
through the lens of American parochialism. The Soviets knew from the onset that war in 
Vietnam was not favorable to their foreign policy aims, one reason being the potentially 
dangerous effect on relations with the United States and China. The Vietnam War, for the 
Soviet Union, produced the unintended risk of empowering the Chinese as an anti-
imperialist alternative to the USSR. Through exploring the intersection of the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and China in Vietnam, this thesis has explored international 
relations in the Cold War beyond the bipolarity of the United States and the Soviet 
Union, illustrating Mao’s attempt to turn revolutionary rhetoric to action on its largest 
global stage through the Vietnam War. 
 Tracing Soviet and Chinese ideologies heading into the Vietnam War allows us to 
understand what each government’s goals were in Vietnam, explaining why Sino-Soviet 
competition existed in Vietnam. A close examination of the largely understudied 
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organization Interkit furthers this story, showing that not only did the Soviet Union and 
China have differing goals and strategies in Vietnam, but also that the Soviet Union 
acknowledged and actively fought against China’s rise to prominence. As the above 
analysis demonstrates, one factor leading to this rise in prominence was China’s role as 
one of the “two big brothers” to North Vietnam, providing advice contrary to that of the 
Soviets.   
 These Sino-Soviet disagreements in Vietnam continued even after the end of the 
war. It became apparent that the leadership of the newly united Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam had its own domestic and regional ambitions and had no desire to be a puppet 
stage of neither the Soviets nor the Chinese. Although China had previously been 
influential in North Vietnam’s war efforts, when the post-war Vietnamese did not openly 
agree with some of their foreign policy views, China was quick to cut off aid to a 
rebuilding Vietnam, which so desperately relied on it. With the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia being the final straw, China attacked along the Sino-Vietnamese border in 
February 1979. In March of the same year, a Vietnamese delegation joined Interkit, 
greeted by “a working group of Interkit…gathered to Moscow to welcome Hanoi to the 
fold, express solidarity with its righteous struggle against Beijing and to condemn 
Maoism, once again.”149 China’s attack on Vietnam and Vietnam’s subsequent 
participation in Interkit left Sino-Vietnamese relations beyond repair and signifying the 
failure of Chinese foreign policy doctrine in Vietnam.  
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 Analyzing Sino-Soviet competition in and after the Vietnam War illustrates the 
complex nature of multinational conflict. Not only has this thesis rebuffed the “Cold War 
mindset” view that the Vietnam War was a U.S.-communist war, but it also illustrated the 
complicated Soviet reality, as they fought both the U.S. and China, as well as being 
engaged in Vietnam. Studying the intersection of America, the Soviet Union, China, and 
Vietnam is beneficial in both academic and policy settings. Not only do these studies 
assist in creating a more complete understanding of Cold War and Vietnam War history, 
but also in underscoring the numerous actors and interests, whether direct or peripheral, 
involved in transnational war, which should cause leaders to take heed in potential crisis 
situations and understand the multifariousness of factors in play in war.   
  
74 
 
WORKS CITED 
 
О Продлении Сроков Засекречивания Сведений, Составляющих  
Государственную Тайну, Засекреченных ВЧК-КГБ СССР в 1917-1991 Годах. 
Межведомственная Комиссия По Защите Государственной Тайны , 12 Mar. 
2014, agentura.ru/projects/control/30years/. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
Brooke, James. “Why Did Vietnam Overthrow the Khmer Rouge in 1978?” Khmer 
Times, 7 Aug. 2014, www.khmertimeskh.com/news/3467/why-did-vietnam-
overthrow-the-khmer-rouge-in-1978-/. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
Burns, Ken, and Lynn Novick. “The River Styx (January 1964-December 1965).” The 
Vietnam War: A Film by Ken Burns and Lynn Novick, episode 3, PBS. 
“Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Moscow, 'Khrushchev’s Reconciliation with the 
United States on the Question of the Cuban Missile Crisis',” October 31, 1962, 
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 111-00342-12, 1-3. 
Camps, Miriam. “NSSM 63 - Meeting with Consultants.” Department of State, 29 Aug. 
1969, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/sino.sov.15.pdf. 
Accessed 28 April 2018. 
Carey, Elaine. Protests in the Streets: 1968 across the Globe. Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc., 2016.  
Chang, Pao-min. Beijing, Hanoi, and the Overseas Chinese. Institute of East Asian 
Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies, 1982. 
“China and Vietnam Sign Land Border Treaty.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People's Republic of China, 15 Nov. 2000, 
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/
2792_663578/2793_663580/t16247.shtml. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
“China-USSR Border: Eastern Sector.” Wikipedia. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
“China, the Soviet Union, and the Vietnam War.” Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, U.S. 
History In Context. 
Chinese General Hoang Minh Thao and Colonel Hoang Minh Phuong quoted by Pierre 
Journoud, researcher at the Defense History Studies (CHED), Paris University 
Pantheon-Sorbonne, in Paris Hanoi Beijing published in Communisme magazine 
and the Pierre Renouvin Institute of Paris, July 20, 2004. 
Cunningham, Maura. “Denying Historians: China’s Archives Increasingly Off-
Bounds.” The Wall Street Journal, 19 Aug. 2014, 
blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/08/19/denying-historians-chinas-archives-
increasingly-off-bounds/. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
Deckers, Wolfgang. “Imperialism' and 'Anti-Imperialism' in Mao Zedong: Origins and 
Development of a Revolutionary Strategy.” The London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 1 Jan. 1997, etheses.lse.ac.uk/1452/. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
“Definition of Sphere in English by Oxford Dictionaries.” Oxford Dictionaries | English, 
Oxford Dictionaries, en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sphere. Accessed 30 
April 2018. 
Denisov, Igor. “Aigun, Russia, and China's ‘Century of Humiliation.’” Carnegie Moscow 
Center, carnegie.ru/commentary/60357. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
75 
 
“Discussion between Mao Zedong and Le Duan,” May 11, 1970, History and Public 
Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, "77 Conversations." 
Translated by Anna Beth Keim. 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113033. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
Duiker, William J. Ho Chi Minh: A Life. Hyperion, 2002. 
“East German Record of Talk with Soviet Communist Party official Boris Kulik,” 
January, 26, 1977, Department of International Relations. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 
B 2/20/126. Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer. 
“East German Report on First Interkit Meeting in Moscow, December 1967,” December 
27, 1967, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Foundation 
Archives of Parties and Mass Organisations of the GDR in the Federal Archives 
(SAPMO-BA) DY 30, IV A 2/20/1150. Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113287. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
“East German Report on the Fourth Interkit Meeting in Sofia, February 1971,” February 
24, 1971, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Foundation 
Archives of Parties and Mass Organisations of the GDR in the Federal Archives 
(SAPMO-BA) DY 30, IV A 2/20/1152. Translated by Bernd Schaefer. 
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113298. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
Ebon, Martin. The Soviet Propaganda Machine. New York, McGraw-Hill. 1987, p. 88 
“Embargoes and Sanctions - Cold War Sanctions.” Encyclopedia of the New American 
Nation, www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Embargoes-and-Sanctions-Cold-
war-sanctions.html. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
Fisher, Harole H. The Communist Revolution: an Outline of Strategy and Tactics. 
Stanford Univ. Pr., 1985. 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1978, Volume 1, Vietnam, 1964, Document 
295. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d295. Accessed 
28 April 2018. 
Friedman, Jeremy Scott. Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Split and the Third World. 
University of North Carolina Press, 2015 
Gaiduk, Ilya V. The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War. I.R. Dee, 1996. 
Higgs, Robert. “U.S. Military Spending in the Cold War Era: Opportunity Costs, Foreign 
Crises, and Domestic Constraints.” Cato Institute, 30 Nov. 1988, 
www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/us-military-spending-cold-war-era-
opportunity-costs-foreign-crises-domestic-constraints. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
Hershberg, James, et al. The Interkit Story: A Window into the Final Decades of the Sino-
Soviet Relationship. The Cold War International History Project: Working Paper 
Series, Feb. 2AD. 
“History.” Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, www.c7f.navy.mil/Subs-and-Squadrons/. 
Accessed 28 April 2018. 
Holdridge, John H. “Comments of Soviet Embassy Officer on China and 
Vietnam.” Department of State, 13 June 1969, 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/sino.sov.5.pdf. Accessed 28 
April 2018. 
76 
 
Hyland, William. “Memorandum for Mr. Kissinger: Sino-Soviet 
Contingencies.” National Security Council, 28 Aug. 1969. 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/sino.sov.14.pdf. Accessed 28 
April 2018. 
“Informational Note from the Eight Parties’ Meeting in Budapest,” March 06, 1978, 
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of Modern Records, 
Warsaw (ANN), KC PZPR, LXXVI – 1027. Obtained and translated for CWIHP 
by Malgorzata K. Gnoinska. 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113245. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
Institute of Far Eastern Studies Russian Academy of Sciences (IFES), 
www.nira.or.jp/past/ice/nwdtt/2005/DAT/1270.html. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
Jersild, Austin. Sino-Soviet Alliance: an International History. Univ Of North Carolina 
Pr, 2016. 
Khrushchev, Nikita S. “On Peaceful Coexistence.” Foreign Affairs, 19 June 2017, 
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1959-10-01/peaceful-coexistence. 
Accessed 28 April 2018. 
Kraus, Richard Curt. The Cultural Revolution: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford 
University Press, 2012. 
Kuisong, Yang. “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-
American Rapprochement.” Cold War History, vol. 1, no. 1, 2000, pp. 21–52., 
doi:10.1080/713999906.  
Lenin, Vladimir. “Division of the World Among Capitalist Associations.” Imperialism, 
the Highest Stage of Capitalism, 1916, pp. 246–253. 
Lenin, Vladimir. What Is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement. International 
Publishers, 1929. 
“Letter, Khrushchev to the Central Committee of The Socialist Unity Party of Germany, 
regarding Soviet Specialists in China,” July 18, 1960, History and Public Policy 
Program Digital Archive, SAPMO DY 30/3605/25-27. Obtained and translated 
for CWIHP by Austin Jersild. 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116831. Accessed 30 April 2018. 
Lu, Xing. The Rhetoric of Mao Zedong: Transforming China and Its People. The 
University of South Carolina Press, 2017. 
Luthi, Lorenz M. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. Princeton 
University Press, 2008.  
Lyle J. Goldstein, Preventive Attack and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Comparative 
Historical Analysis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 79. 
“Memorandum of Conversation between comrade Enver Hoxha and a Delegation of 
Chinese Red Guards,” July 08, 1967, History and Public Policy Program Digital 
Archive, AQSH, F. 14/AP, M-PKK, V. 1967, Dos. 43, Fl. 1-18. Obtained and 
translated by Elidor Mëhilli. 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117303. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
“Messages to America: The Letters of Ho Chi Minh.” History Is a Weapon, 
www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon2/hochiminh/. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
77 
 
Morris, Stephen J. “The Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese Triangle in the 1970's: The View 
from Moscow.” Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, vol. 25, Apr. 
1999, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACFB2E.pdf. Accessed 28 
April 2018. 
Morris, Stephen J. Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of 
War. Stanford University Press, 1999. 
“New American Nation.” Encyclopedia of the New American Nation, 
www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Embargoes-and-Sanctions-Cold-war-
sanctions.html. Accessed 29 April 2018. 
“Note by the East German Embassy in Hanoi on a Joint Conversation with the 
Ambassadors from other Socialist Countries in the Hungarian Embassy on 4 May 
1965,” May 12, 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive 
“Note from the Conversation between Comrade Zenon Kliszko and CC CCP Secretary 
Liu Ningyi,” June 16, 1967, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 
Polish Central Archives of Modern Records (AAN), KC PZPR, V/84 and XIA/23. 
Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Malgorzata K. Gnoinska. 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112707. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
“Note from the Eighth Meeting of the Deputy Heads of the CC International Departments 
of Eight Parties in Ulaanbaatar devoted to the Struggle with Maoism,” June, 1974, 
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of Modern Records, 
Warsaw (AAN), KC PZPR, LXXVI-1027. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by 
Malgorzata K. Gnoinska. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113240. 
Accessed 28 April 2018. 
“Note on a Conversation by Tarka, Jurgas, and Milc at the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi 
[Excerpts],” September 10, 1964, History and Public Policy Program Digital 
Archive 
“Note on a Conversation with an Unnamed Representative of the International 
Department of the CPSU CC on the Situation in Vietnam [Excerpts],” July 09, 
1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive 
Petraeus, David Howell. “The American Military and the Lessons From Vietnam: A 
Study of American Influence and the Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam 
Era.” Princeton University, 1987. 
“Polish-Soviet Talks in Moscow,” October 10-15, 1966. Andrzej Paczkowski, ed. Tajne 
Dokumenty Biura Politycznego PRL-ZSRR, 1956-1970 (London: Aneks 
Publishers, 1998), doc. 28 (pp. 364-432). translated by Malgorzata K. Gnoinska. 
Radchenko, Sergey. “Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for 
Supremacy, 1962-1967.” Stanford University Press, 2009. 
"Results of the Visit of the Vietnamese Party-Government Delegation to China (1975)," 
TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1933. 
Richard Nixon: "The President's News Conference," December 8, 1969. Online by 
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.  
Sambath, Phou. Cambodia-China Relation Past Present and Future. IIMBA, College of 
Management , 
www.ncku.edu.tw/cseas/98CSEAS/report%20SEA/CAM/cam11%20phou%20sam
bath.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
78 
 
“Secret Telegram No. 3638/IV - From Moscow to Warsaw,” December 18, 1980, History 
and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of Modern Records, Warsaw 
(AAN), KC PZPR, XIA/1273. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Malgorzata 
K. Gnoinska. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113331. Accessed 
28 April 2018. 
Soldatov, Andrei, and Irina Borogan. The New Nobility: Essays on the History of the 
FSB. Alpha Business Books/United Press, 2010. 
Soviet GNP and Defense Outlays, 1950-1990. CIA Library, www.cia.gov/library/center-
for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/watching-
the-bear-essays-on-cias-analysis-of-the-soviet-
union/graphics/Figure2.jpg/image.jpg. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
 “Soviet Report to East German Leadership on Sino-Soviet Border Clashes,” March 02, 
1969, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAMPO-BArch J IV 
2/202/359. Translated by Christian F. Ostermann. 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116975. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
“Soviet Memorandum on the Polish Peace Initiative on Vietnam,” February, 1963, 
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of Modern Records 
(AAN), Warsaw. 
Spector, Ronald H. “Vietnam War.” Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 8 May 2017. 
“Speech by Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, at the 869th Plenary Meeting of the 15th Session of 
the United Nations General Assembly,” September 23, 1960,. 
https://archive.org/stream/khrushchevinamer006997mbp/khrushchevinamer00699
7mbp_djvu.txt. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
Stearman, William L. “US Reaction to Soviet Destruction of CPR [Chinese Peoples 
Republic] Nuclear Capability; Significance of Latest Sino-Soviet Border Clash, 
....” U.S. Department of State, 18 Aug. 1969. 
Tang, Truong Nhu. A Vietcong Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and Its 
Aftermath. Vintage Books, 1985.  
“Telegram from Aurel Duma to Corneliu Manescu Concerning the Conversation with 
Zhou Enlai,” August 23, 1969, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 
A.M.A.E., fond Telegrams, Beijing, vol. II, 1969, f. 269-270. Also published in 
Relatiile Romano-Chineze, 1880-1974 [SinoRomanian Relations, 1880-1974], 
edited by Ioan Romulus Budura, (Bucharest, 2005), pp. 939-941. Translated by 
Madalina Cristoloveanu. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117757. 
Accessed 28 April 2018. 
"Telegrams from Romanian Embassy, Beijing, to Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
22-24 August 1968," August 24, 1968, History and Public Policy Program Digital 
Archive, Romanian Foreign Ministry Archives (AMAE), fond Telegrams, Pekin 
1968, Vol II, pp. 272-274. Republished in Romulus Ioan Budura, coordinator, 
Relaţiile Româno-Chineze 1880-1974: Documente [Romanian-Chinese Relations 
1880-1974: Documents], Bucureşti, Ministerul Afacerilor Externe [Foreign 
Affairs Ministry], Arhivele Naţionale [National Archives], 2005, p. 901-902. 
Translated for CWIHP by Mircea Munteanu. 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113289. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
79 
 
“Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense 
McNamara,” January 17, 1966, Foreign Relations of the United States, pp. 74-81 
“Telex from Department Head van Well, 'China Visit by the Foreign Minister',” October 
13, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Institut für 
Zeitgeschichte, ed., Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland: 1972. 3, 1. Oktober bis 31. Dezember 1972 (München: Oldenbourg, 
2003), 1532-1534. Translated by Bernd Schaefer. 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119983. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
“The CCP Central Committee's Order for General Mobilization in Border Provinces and 
Regions,” August 28, 1969, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 
Obtained and translated by Michael Schoenhals. 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110473. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
“The Effect of the Vietnam War on the Economies of the Communist Countries.” Issue 
brief no. 70. 1998. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/esau-37.pdf. 
Accessed 28 April 2018. 
The Evolution of Soviet Policy in the Sino-Soviet Border Dispute. CIA Directorate of 
Intelligence, April 28, 1970. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/esau-
44.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
“The Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance Between the People's 
Republic of China and the Soviet Union.” CIA Library, 30 Aug. 2000, 
www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01443R000300050007-
8.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2018. 
Turley, William S. "Vietnam Since Reunification," Problems of Communism. March-
April 1977. 47-48 
United States Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts 
Office , and Michael S Gerson. “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict: Deterrence, 
Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969 .” 
V. Sviridov (2nd Secretary, Embassy of the USSR in the SRV), "O nekotorikh aspektakh 
v'etnamokitaiskikh otnoshenii" ["About several aspects of Vietnamese-Chinese 
relations"], April 1976, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2313, l.18. 
“Vietnam Statistics - War Costs: Complete Picture Impossible.” CQ Almanac Online 
Edition, library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal75-1213988. 
Accessed 28 April 2018. 
Viotti, Paul R, and Mark V Kauppi. International Relations and World Politics. 5th ed., 
Pearson, 2013. 
W.R. Smyser, The Independent Vietnamese: Vietnamese Communism Between Russia 
and China 1956-1969 (Ohio University, Center For International Studies, Papers in 
International Studies: Southeast Asia No. 55, 1980), p. 122. 
Wolff, David. “Interkit: Soviet Sinology and the Sino-Soviet Rift.” 
World Communist Reaction to the Invasion of Czechoslovakia. CIA Directorate of 
Intelligence, 1968, www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000126876.pdf. 
Accessed 28 April 2018. 
80 
 
Yufan, Hao, and Zhai Zhihai. “China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History 
Revisted.” The China Quarterly, vol. 121, 1990, p. 94., 
doi:10.1017/s0305741000013527. 
Zedong, Mao. People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their 
Lackeys; Statements Supporting the Afro-Americans and the Peoples of Southern 
Vietnam, Panama, Japan, the Congo (L.) and the Dominican Republic in Their 
Just Struggle against U. S. Imperialism. Foreign Languages Press, 1967. 
Zedong, Mao. Revolutionary Forces of the World Unite, Fight against Imperialist 
Aggression! 1968. 
